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THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD: IT’S NOT
WHAT IT IS, BUT HOW IT’S MADE,
MEASURED, AND DECIDED
MERCER BULLARD†
The scope and substance of an investment adviser’s fiduciary
duty has recently become a primary focus of U.S. legislators and
regulators.
A U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(“Commission” or “SEC”) study (“Section 913 Study”) required by
section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (the “Dodd-Frank Act”),1 concluded that
broker-dealers should be subject to a fiduciary duty when
providing personalized investment advice to retail investors.2 In
a similar vein, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) proposed to
expand the kind of investment advice that would trigger
fiduciary obligations under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) for persons who provide
Both
investment advice to plans and plan participants.3
initiatives have provoked protests from legislators and the
financial services industry that have, at least temporarily,
stymied regulators’ plans.
This Article addresses the SEC’s fiduciary rulemaking under
Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act, but takes a step back from
the debate to frame the discussion in a more holistic context.
This author’s previous article on the fiduciary standard discussed
how the implementation of a fiduciary duty is largely contextual;
a variety of factors other than the scope and substance of the
fiduciary duty are proximately related to achieving the social

†
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Distinguished Lecturer, The University of Mississippi School of Law.
1
See Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
2
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND
BROKER-DEALERS (2011), available at http://sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913study
final.pdf.
3
See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,263 (proposed Oct. 22,
2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 86).
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benefits that the fiduciary duty is intended to create.4 Achieving
these benefits may depend on, among other things: (1) the
limiting of “investment advice” to advice regarding securities, as
opposed to, for example, insurance and banking products; (2) the
private venues that are available to enforce this right, for
example, arbitration, or state or federal court; (3) the conduct
standards imposed under non-securities regulatory regimes, for
example, ERISA for employee benefit plans, state insurance law
for insurance products; (4) the powers and jurisdiction of
applicable regulators, for example, the Commission, selfregulatory organizations and states, enforcement versus
rulemaking; and (5) the regulation of issuers and intermediaries,
for example, mutual fund disclosure and broker sales practices.
In each case, these factors turn on issues other than the scope—
who should have a fiduciary duty—and substance—what should
that duty require—of the fiduciary duty.
This Article considers three such factors that play an
important role in framing the fiduciary debate: the rising
prominence of a libertarian metric for evaluating the fiduciary
duty; the development of a fiduciary duty for broker-dealers by
their self-regulatory organization, rather than the Commission;
and the existing fiduciary duty as applied in private claims,
especially in arbitration proceedings. The first factor is one that
has recently assumed a prominent role. The social utility of the
fiduciary duty has generally been judged according to a
utilitarian metric that evaluates social policy based on the
policy’s effect on net social wealth. Under this metric, the
fiduciary duty is good policy if it results in an increase in net
social wealth, even if accompanied by a decrease in some utilities,
such as individual freedom. Recent policy debates have reflected
a competing metric for evaluating the fiduciary duty, however,
based on libertarian values. Under this libertarian metric,
reductions in individual freedom beyond a certain point trump
the utilitarian metric. The fiduciary duty is not good social policy
under a libertarian metric if it reduces individual freedom
beyond a certain point, even if the policy would increase net

4
See generally Mercer Bullard, The Fiduciary Study: A Triumph of Substance
over Form?, 30 REV. BANKING FIN. L. 171 (2011).
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social wealth. The SEC’s current paralysis with respect to
Section 913 rulemaking may be largely attributable to
policymakers’ shift from utilitarian to libertarian values.
Next, this Article turns from the social metrics applied to
evaluate the fiduciary duty to the second factor—the source of
the fiduciary duty. The current debate has focused on Congress
(the Dodd-Frank Act) and the Commission (Section 913
rulemaking) as the sources of an expanded fiduciary duty.
However, the self-regulatory organization for broker-dealers, the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), has already
taken significant steps toward imposing a de facto fiduciary duty
on the same broker-dealers to which a Section 913 rulemaking
would apply.
FINRA’s new suitability rule, for example,
embraces a strongly fiduciary approach.5
FINRA may be
motivated to expand the fiduciary duty of broker-dealers in part
because this position supports its stated goal of being designated
the self-regulatory organization for investment advisers.6 The
shift of the fiduciary debate to the FINRA arena may also reflect
a broader re-alignment in the administrative state in which
power is shifted from government agencies that are susceptible to
political influence to more politically insulated SROs and other
quasi-governmental entities. However, there are signs that
FINRA’s insulation from political factors may be on the wane.
Finally, this Article moves from public sources of law—
Congress, the SEC, and FINRA—to the third factor—private
sources of law. A fiduciary duty as imposed by the Commission
would not, and the existing quasi-fiduciary duty imposed by
FINRA does not, create a private cause of action, but state law
has long provided a private claim against broker-dealers for
violating a fiduciary duty. In comparison with the SEC’s and
FINRA’s inchoate public law fiduciary duty, the private law
fiduciary duty is well-developed and frequently litigated.7
Fiduciary duty violations are the most frequently asserted claims
in broker-dealer arbitration proceedings.8
5
FINRA Rule 2111, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_
viewall.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859.
6
The Investment Adviser Oversight Act of 2012: Hearing on H.R. 4624 Before the
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 13–15 (2012) [hereinafter Investment Adviser
Oversight Act Hearing] (statement of Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority).
7
See infra Part III; see generally infra note 124.
8
See infra Part III, note 123.
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However, the substance and scope of this private fiduciary
duty is indeterminate. The overwhelming majority of private
claims are brought in arbitration, where arbitrators are not
required to and do not explain their decisions, rather than in
court, where public decisions allow for an empirical evaluation of
claims.9 Some commentators have evaluated the “fairness” of
arbitration claims based on plaintiffs’ win rates in fully litigated
proceedings.10 This Article takes issue with this methodology on
the ground that plaintiffs’ win rates actually reveal nothing
about the substantive fairness or unfairness of arbitration as a
whole. Thus, the private arena in which broker-dealers’ fiduciary
duties are actually being sorted out defies critical analysis,
which, in turn, frustrates any attempt to evaluate the full effects
of the development of a public fiduciary duty by the SEC or
FINRA.
I.

SOCIAL METRICS OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY

For the most part, the current debate about a Section 913
rulemaking has assumed that the social metric that should be
used to evaluate a fiduciary duty is a utilitarian one.11 The
debate has focused on whether the benefits of the fiduciary duty
would outweigh its costs, with each side disagreeing about the
types and amounts of costs and benefits.12 Nonetheless, each side
seems to agree about using such a cost-benefit, utilitarian
analysis to decide what form of fiduciary duty, if any, would be
good public policy.13 There is evidence, however, that the
utilitarian rhetoric of some opponents of a fiduciary duty serves
an ulterior, non-utilitarian motive.14 They may be motivated, in
fact, by a libertarian metric that elevates individual freedom
above utilitarian values. This libertarian metric is consistent
with the increasing purchase in elective politics of small
government values and popular mistrust of cost-benefit analysis
and social engineering by administrative agencies. The fiduciary
9

See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
11
See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF
REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002); Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid Style in Regulatory
Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 640–42 (2012) (describing “ ‘familiar script’ ” of
efficiency, rationality, and cost-benefit analysis in administrative role).
12
See Short, supra note 11, at 641.
13
See id.
14
See discussion infra notes 32–60.
10
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duty may not hold up well under a libertarian metric. Its future,
therefore, may depend on the fiduciary debate being resolved
beyond the influence of current Congressional politics.
The term “utilitarian metric” is used here to refer to the
evaluation of public policy based on its effect on net social wealth.
Under this metric, the fiduciary duty would be preferable to the
suitability standard that currently applies to broker-dealers15 if it
caused a net increase in social wealth, regardless of the wealth
effect as to any subset of society, such as investors who do not
need the protection that the fiduciary duty offers. For example,
the fiduciary duty may be good policy if it corrects a market
inefficiency arising from asymmetric information between
broker-dealers and their customers.16
But some industry
members have argued that a fiduciary duty may reduce net social
wealth by raising the cost of some financial services, thereby
leaving some existing broker-dealer customers unable to afford
certain products or services.17 The fiduciary duty could generate
a net decrease in social wealth if the additional costs incurred by
society outweighed the improvement in investors’ investment
outcomes.18
15
FINRA Rule 2111, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_
viewall.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859.
16
See Michael Finke & Thomas P. Langdon, The Impact of the Broker-Dealer
Fiduciary Standard on Financial Advice, 25 J. FIN. PLAN., no. 7, 2012, at 28, 28–37,
available at http://www.fpanet.org/journal/TheImpactoftheBrokerDealerFiduciary
Standard (“Imposition of a universal fiduciary standard among financial advisers
may result in a net welfare gain to society, and in particular to consumers who are
ill-equipped to reduce agency costs on their own by more closely monitoring an
adviser with superior information, although this will likely occur at the expense of
the broker-dealer industry.”).
17
See Ensuring Appropriate Regulatory Oversight of Broker-Dealers and
Legislative Proposals To Improve Investment Adviser Oversight: Hearing on H.R.
112-58 Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkt. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 1–18 (2011) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of
John Taft, Chairman, Security Industry and Financial Market Association and
testimony of Terry Headley, President, National. Association of Insurance and
Financial Advisors) (fiduciary duty could make it “economically unfeasible for
financial professionals to work with less affluent clients”); SIFMA & OLIVER WYMAN,
STANDARD OF CARE HARMONIZATION: IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR SEC (2010) (Section
913 fiduciary duty could make commission-based services more expensive for
investors and “force the majority of these investors into fee-based managed accounts
at a higher cost factor”).
18
See Hearings, supra note 17 (noting that the “universal fiduciary standard of
care” would force many brokers to discontinue providing many important services to
middle-market clients). Contra Finke & Langdon, supra note 16 (“Empirical results
provide no evidence that the broker-dealer industry is affected significantly by the
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The utilitarian metric can be illustrated in the context of
variable annuity sales, which have often been cited by regulators
and investor advocates as emblematic of the improper sales
practices of non-fiduciaries.19 Some argue that broker-dealers
often recommend variable annuities to investors for whom they
are not the best option, in part because broker-dealers receive
higher compensation for selling a variable annuity than from
selling another variable annuity or a mutual fund.20 Investors’
imposition of a stricter legal fiduciary standard on the conduct of registered
representatives.”).
19
See generally FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., MEMBERS’ RESPONSIBILITIES
REGARDING
DEFERRED
VARIABLE
ANNUITIES
(2008),
available
at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=14663
(imposing heightened suitability requirements for sales of variable annuities); NAT’L
ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 99-35, THE NASD REMINDS MEMBERS
OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING THE SALES OF VARIABLE ANNUITIES (1999);
NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 96-86, NASD REGULATION
REMINDS MEMBERS AND ASSOCIATED PERSONS THAT SALES OF VARIABLE CONTRACTS
ARE SUBJECT TO NASD SUITABILITY REQUIREMENTS (1996); SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N &
NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS, JOINT SEC/NASD REPORT ON EXAMINATION
FINDINGS REGARDING BROKER-DEALER SALES OF VARIABLE INSURANCE PRODUCTS
(2004); SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS’N, & FIN. INDUS.
REGULATORY AUTH., PROTECTING SENIOR INVESTORS: REPORT OF EXAMINATIONS OF
SECURITIES FIRMS PROVIDING “FREE LUNCH” SEMINARS 21–22 (2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/seniors/freelunchreport.pdf; Letter from AARP, N. Am.
Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, Fund Democracy, & Consumer Fed’n of Am., to Christopher
Dodd, Chairman and Richard Shelby, Ranking Member, Comm. on Banking, Hous.
& Urban Dev., U.S. Senate (Feb. 2, 2010), available at http://www.nasaa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/08/39-Fill-In-The-Blank-Sec-913-Letter-2.3.10.doc (discussing
abusive sales practices in sale of variable annuities to seniors); Advertising of Bonus
Credit Variable Annuities, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://www.finra.org/
Industry/Regulation/Guidance/RCA/p015306 (last visited Dec. 31, 2013) (warning
against misleading sales practices); Should You Exchange Your Variable Annuity?,
FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., https://www.finra.org/Investors/ProtectYourself/
InvestorAlerts/AnnuitiesAndInsurance/p006045 (last updated Mar. 2, 2006) (citing
abusive sales practices); Variable Annuities: Beyond the Hard Sell, FIN. INDUS.
REGULATORY AUTH., http://www.finra.org/investors/protectyourself/investoralerts/
annuitiesandinsurance/p005976 (last updated Aug. 31, 2009); James W. Watkins,
Variable Annuities: Reading Between the Marketing Lines, COMMONSENSE
INVESTSENSE (2002), http://investsense.com/variable-annuities/ (variable annuities
are “one of the most overhyped, most oversold, and least understood investment
products”); Liz Pulliam Weston, The Basics: The Worst Retirement Investment You
Can Make, JOHN C. GOWER, http://www.jcgower.com/media/The$20Worst$20Retire
ment$20Investment$20You$20Can$20Make.pdf (last visited Dec. 31, 2013).
20
See, e.g., Prime Capital Services, Inc., Release No. 398, 2010 WL 2546835, at
*38–40 (ALJ June 25, 2010) (administrative law judge finding that broker-dealers
committed fraud in connection with sales of variable annuities to elderly customers
and received commissions of up to 8.6%); Focus Point Solutions, Inc., Release No.
3458, 2012 WL 3863221, at *1 (ALJ Sept. 6, 2012) (Undisclosed revenue sharing
“agreement created incentives for [investment adviser] to favor a particular category
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purchases of variable annuities therefore may result in
suboptimal financial results for investors and impose negative
net costs on society.21 In theory, the fiduciary duty would require
that broker-dealers recommend the best product, thereby
improving investors’ financial experience and increasing net
social wealth.22
Proponents of the fiduciary duty might argue that this could
be accomplished in two ways. First, the fiduciary duty could
mandate enhanced disclosure of selling compensation, which, like
price transparency generally, could promote competition and
lower prices by heightening investors’ price sensitivity.23 Second,
of mutual funds over other investments.”); see also Wall Street and Fiduciary Duties:
Can Jail Time Serve as an Adequate Deterrent for Willful Violations?: Hearing on S.
J-111-88 Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 6 (2010) [hereinafter Roper Testimony] (testimony of Barbara
Roper, Director of Investor Protection, Consumer Federation of America) (“The most
common problem faced by retail investors is sale of products to benefit the broker‘s
bottom line rather than the client‘s financial well-being. In a fairly typical example,
a broker might recommend a particular mutual fund or 529 plan or variable
annuity, not because it has the lowest fees, the best management, or the best
allocation of assets to match the client‘s investment goals, but rather because it pays
the highest commission or makes revenue sharing payments to the firm.”); Barbara
Black, Brokers and Advisers—What’s in a Name?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
31, 45 (2005) (discussing brokers’ incentives to engage in fraud). See generally
Edward O’Neal, Mutual Fund Share Classes and Broker Incentives, 55 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 76 (1999) (discussing broker-dealers’ incentives to recommend class of
shares paying the highest selling compensation).
21
See Scott Burns, Variable Annuity Watch, 2008, ASSETBUILDER,
http://assetbuilder.com/blogs/scott_burns/archive/2008/08/22/variable-annuitywatch-2008.aspx (estimating that variable annuities transfer approximately $25.6
billion each year “of spendable investment returns” from vulnerable investors to the
insurance industry); see also Benjamin Cummings & Michael Finke, The Economics
of Fiduciary Investment Advice 8 (Sept. 1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1701181 (“[P]roductbased compensation is ubiquitous within the industry and rarely leads to
recommendations that are clearly in the best interest of the consumer.”).
22
This assumes that broker-dealers would change their behavior under a
fiduciary duty. This assumption may be incorrect because, as discussed infra Parts
II, III, broker-dealers already may be subject to a de facto fiduciary duty. In
addition, investors may be able to bring successful claims with respect to variable
annuity sales practices under antifraud principles without needing to show breach of
a fiduciary duty, although proving fiduciary claims generally will be easier because
of lower standards of proof as to the broker-dealer’s intent and the cause of the
plaintiff’s loss.
23
See Conformation Requirements and Point of Sale Disclosure Requirements
for Transactions in Certain Mutual Funds and Other Securities, and Other
Confirmation Requirement Amendments, and Amendments to the Registration
Form for Mutual Funds, Release No. 33-8358, Investment Company Act Release No.
26341, 2004 WL 184973 (proposed 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 240, &
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it could mandate recommendations that not only were suitable,
but also were in the client’s best interests. This would require
the broker-dealer to recommend the best product for the
customer, and not necessarily the one that pays the highest
compensation.
This analysis makes empirical assumptions on which some
critics of the fiduciary duty disagree. They argue that enhanced
disclosure or a substantive best-interest standard might not
produce enough benefits to outweigh any attendant increase in
social costs.24 Two Republican Commissioners criticized the
recommendations in the Section 913 Study on the ground that
they lacked “a basis to reasonably conclude that a uniform
standard or harmonization would enhance investor protection”
and insisted upon a “stronger analytical and empirical
foundation” before rulemaking could proceed.25
The utilitarian metric as applied in the fiduciary duty
context reflects an increasing emphasis on utilitarian analysis by
Congress, the courts, and the Commission. Examples include a
series of recent D.C. Circuit cases in which the court vacated
SEC rules for failing to conduct an adequate cost-benefit
analysis.26 Members of Congress have attacked the SEC’s costbenefit analyses, holding one hearing titled “The SEC’s Aversion
to Cost-Benefit Analysis,”27 and released a flurry of bills imposing
greater cost-benefit requirements on agency rulemaking.28 The
274) (proposing a rule to require additional disclosure of revenue sharing
compensation); Cummings & Finke, supra note 21 (“Commissions for financial
products are extremely opaque, and the industry has fought to maintain those that
are most difficult to detect by consumers (e.g., 12b-1 fees on mutual funds).”). See
generally Raj Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM.
ECON. REV. 1145 (2009) (showing that price salience correlates positively with price
sensitivity).
24
Kathleen Casey & Troy Paredes, Comm’rs, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement
by SEC Commissioners: Statement Regarding Study on Investment Advisers And
Broker-Dealers (Jan. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Statement of Casey & Paredes],
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch012211klctap.htm (criticizing
Section 913 Study).
25
Id.
26
See generally Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Am.
Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Chamber of
Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
27
The SEC’s Aversion to Cost-Benefit Analysis: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
TARP, Fin. Servs. & Bailouts of Pub. & Private Programs of the H. Comm. on
Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112 Cong. 1–3(2012) [hereinafter Cost-Benefit Hearing].
28
See, e.g., Small Business Freedom of Commerce Act of 2013, H.R. 168, 113th
Cong. (2013); Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act of 2012, S. 3468, 112th
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Commission has relented under this pressure, promising to hire
dozens of additional economists29 and make evaluating the costs
of regulation to the industry a top priority.30
The fiduciary debate as framed above suggests that both
proponents and critics of the fiduciary duty agree on using a
utilitarian metric to measure the social value of the fiduciary
duty.31 However, the use of a utilitarian metric by opponents of
the fiduciary duty may actually reflect libertarian values.
Libertarian values are implicated by the fiduciary duty because,
for example, mandatory disclosure under a fiduciary duty may
deny investors the freedom to contract privately for such
disclosure while making them pay the costs of disclosure
regardless of whether they need it.32 Requiring that brokerdealers’ recommendations be in the best interests of customers
would impose additional transaction costs on those customers
who would otherwise make their own best-interest
determinations, possibly without providing them with any
countervailing benefit.
Certain legislators, judges, and
regulators who are motivated by these libertarian concerns may
Cong. (2012); Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act of 2011, S. 1615, 112th Cong.
(2011); Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011, S. 1606, 112th Cong. (2011); SEC
Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 2308, 112th Cong. (2011); Regulatory Flexibility
Improvements Act of 2011, H.R. 527, 112th Cong. (2011). See generally Ben Protess,
Lawmakers Push To Increase White House Oversight of Financial Regulators, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 9, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/09/lawmakers-push-toincrease-white-house-oversight-of-financial-regulators.
29
See Cost-Benefit Hearing, supra note 27 (oral and written testimony of Mary
Schapiro, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission).
30
See Memorandum from RSFI and OGC to the Staff of the Rulewriting
Divisions and Offices on Current Guidance on Economic Analysis in SEC
Rulemakings (Mar. 16, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi_
guidance_econ_analy_secrulemaking.pdf.
31
See Investment Adviser Oversight Act Hearing, supra note 6, at 3 (testimony
of Chet Helck, Chairman-Elect, Securities Industry and Financial Market
Association) (“SIFMA supports the establishment of a uniform fiduciary standard for
broker-dealers and investment advisers when they provide personalized investment
advice about securities to retail customers.”); Cass R. Sunstein, The Stunning
Triumph of Cost-Benefit Analysis, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 12, 2012, 6:30 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-12/the-stunning-triumph-of-cost-benefitanalysis.html (“[R]epublicans and Democrats have come to agree on one issue: the
essential need for cost-benefit analysis in the regulatory process. In fact, cost-benefit
analysis has become part of the informal constitution of the U.S. regulatory state.”).
32
Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A
Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 28–32 (1990) (comparing
the cost and benefits of mandatory fiduciary duties versus freedom of contract in a
corporate setting).
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simply be using the more intellectually acceptable rhetoric of
utilitarian cost-benefit analysis as cover. This is an admittedly
unprovable claim: Any assertion that libertarian motives stand
behind stated cost-benefit concerns is inherently subjective and
arguably counterintuitive. Nonetheless, there is evidence that
the utilitarian concerns of cost-benefit advocates are motivated
more by a desire to rein in rulemaking per se than to produce
more accurate utilitarian analysis.33
In some cases, the cost-benefit analysis demanded by critics
does not square with a utilitarian metric because it appears not
to be practicably achievable. In a series of decisions vacating
SEC rules,34 the D.C. Circuit has applied a seemingly impossible
standard to meet, requiring that, no matter what cost-benefit
findings the Commission had made, it was always required to go
one step further.35 The empirical analysis demanded by the SEC
Commissioners who dissented from the Section 913 study could
not practicably be accomplished by the agency in any reasonable
timeframe, if at all.36 They made it clear that any rulemaking
33
See Short, supra note 11, at 668–69 (finding that the dominant critique of
regulation in academic literature reflects libertarian concern that regulation is
coercive).
34
See supra note 26.
35
See James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes:
Confronting the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L.
REV. 1811, 1827–28 (2012).
36
For example, they argued that the Commission should conduct an “[a]nalysis
of the investor returns (controlling for risk and investor characteristics such as age,
income, and education) generated under the two existing regulatory regimes.”
Statement of Casey & Paredes, supra note 24. It would not be possible to identify
with any precision the category of accounts that fit within a particular regime—it is
the overlapping nature of commission, and fee-based arrangements, that has created
the very problem that a universal fiduciary is intended to address—much less to
calculate with any precision the investment returns experienced under a fiduciary
and a non-fiduciary regime. See F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502,
519 (2009) (“There are some propositions for which scant empirical evidence can be
marshaled.”). There have been studies that address the general question of the value
of brokers’ services, but they are so cabined by caveats as to provide little concrete
direction as to the precise contours of the fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Daniel
Bergstresser et al., Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Brokers in the Mutual Fund
Industry 2 (Nov. 8, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://business.
rice.edu/uploadedFiles/Faculty_and_Research/Academic_Areas/Finance/Seminar_PD
Fs/bbenefits_Nov2004.pdf; Mercer Bullard et al., Investor Timing and Fund
Distribution Channels 2–3 (June 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1070545 (load fund investors experience larger performance
gaps than no-load fund investors); Mercer Bullard & Edward S. O’Neal, The Costs of
Using a Broker To Select Mutual Funds (Inst. for Highest Educ. Law & Governance
Monograph 07-03, 2006), available at http://www.law.uh.edu/ihelg/mono
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conducted without doing this analysis “would be ill-conceived at
best and harmful at worst.”37 When agencies have requested
cost-benefit data that critics have demanded they consider, they
have been roundly chastised, as illustrated by Congressional and
industry responses to a recent DOL request for economic data.38
A bill passed by the House in August 2012 generally prohibited
agency rulemaking until the national unemployment rate
declined below six percent.39 The idea that a specific national
unemployment rate could be a rational determinant of the
utilitarian value of specific SEC rulemaking is inherently
unreasonable, but it is consistent with the advancement of a
libertarian metric, albeit clothed as a utilitarian one.
A libertarian metric provides a more coherent explanation of
the position of cost-benefit advocates. Cost-benefit advocates
embrace utilitarian analysis when more paternalistic policies are
being considered, whereas they have eschewed utilitarian
analysis when the public policies considered would increase
individual freedom rather than constrain it.
The current
regulatory environment has provided a relatively rare
opportunity to see this inconsistency in action. Under the DoddFrank Act and the Jumpstart Our Business Startup Act (the

graph/07-03.pdf (discussing higher expenses of broker-sold funds); Diane Del
Guercio et al., Broker Incentives and Mutual Fund Market Segmentation 35–36
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16312, 2010), available at
https://www2.bc.edu/jonathan-reuter/research/NBER_WP16312.pdf
(evaluating
performance of mutual funds sold in direct and broker-sold distribution channels).
37
Statement of Casey & Paredes, supra note 24.
38
See Letter from Dale E. Brown, President & CEO, Fin. Servs. Inst., to John
Kline & George Miller, House Educ. & Workforce Comm., U.S. House of
Representatives (July 10, 2012), available at http://www.financialservices.org/
uploadedFiles/FSI_Content/Latest_News/Miller-Kline%20Fiduciary%20Letter.pdf
(responding to Borzi letter dated June 20, 2012); Letter from Congressional
Democrats to Hilda Solis, Sec’y of Labor, Dep’t of Labor (June 25, 2012), available at
http://www.sparkinstitute.org/content-files/File/Dem%20Letter%20to%20DOL%20re
%20Fiduciary%20Proposal%206-25-12.pdf (describing Borzi data request as
“unrealistic in scope and timing”); Letter from Phyllis Borzi, Assistant Sec’y for
Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., Dep’t of Labor, to John Kline & George Miller, House
Educ. & Workforce Comm., U.S. House of Representatives (June 20, 2012), available
at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/KlineMillerfiduciaryupdateletter.pdf (discussing data
request). See generally Darla Mercado, FSI Unloads on Borzi, INVESTMENT NEWS
(July 10, 2012, 2:47 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20120710/FREE/
120719992 (discussing Financial Services Institute response to DOL request for
data).
39
See H.R. Res. 4078, 112th Cong. (2012) (enacted).
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“JOBS Act”),40 enacted only sixteen months apart, Congress
ordered the Commission to engage in rulemaking at opposite
ends of the paternalistic-to-libertarian regulatory spectrum. The
Dodd-Frank Act requires rules generally increasing regulation,
while the JOBS Act requires rules generally lessening it.41 The
same members of Congress who have criticized the SEC’s costbenefit analysis in connection with Dodd-Frank rulemaking that
they oppose have expressed no such concerns regarding JOBS
Act rulemaking that they support.42 They have complained that
the Commission has not spent enough time considering the costs,
for example, of the Dodd-Frank Act’s requirement that issuers
disclose information regarding certain minerals produced in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (“conflict minerals”), while
expressing no such concern regarding the JOBS Act exemption
for crowd funding securities offerings and private offerings under
Regulation D.
The seemingly contradictory positions of cost-benefit
advocates have been particularly apparent in connection with the
SEC’s rulemaking on conflict minerals and the private offering
exemption.43 Two Republican SEC Commissioners voted against
and issued critiques of the SEC’s conflict minerals rule, the
statutory deadline for which had passed seventeen months
earlier, on the ground that the SEC staff’s cost-benefit analysis
was inadequate.44 One week later, the same Commissioners
supported a proposal to eliminate the ban on general solicitation

40
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
306 (2012).
41
Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open Meeting
To Adopt a Final Rule Regarding the Conflict Minerals Pursuant to Section 1502 of
the Dodd-Frank Act (Aug. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Paredes Minerals Statement],
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch082212tap-minerals.htm.
42
See Cost-Benefit Hearing, supra note 27.
43
See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General
Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 339354, 2012 WL 4356706 (proposed Sept. 5, 2012), available at http://sec.gov/rules/
proposed/2012/33-9354.pdf; Conflict Minerals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-67716,
2012 WL 3611799 (Aug. 22, 2012), available at http://sec.gov/rules/final/2012/3467716.pdf; Conflict Minerals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-63547 (proposed Dec. 15,
2010), available at http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/2010/34-63547.pdf.
44
See Paredes Minerals Statement, supra note 41; Daniel Gallagher, Comm’r,
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at SEC Open Meeting: Proposed Rule To
Implement Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act—the “Conflict Minerals” Provision
(Aug. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Gallagher Minerals Statement], available at
http://sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch082212dmg-minerals.htm.
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and advertising without even mentioning cost-benefit
requirements, much less whether the requirements had been
satisfied.45 The conflict minerals rulemaking missed its 270-day
deadline by more than seventeen months, while the general
solicitation and advertising proposal was only fifty-seven days
past its ninety-day deadline.46 Nonetheless, the Republican
Commissioners argued the former needed more work and should
be delayed further, while the latter should not even have been
subject to public notice and comment, much less any cost-benefit
analysis.47 They would have held the former rulemaking, which
45

See Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open
Meeting To Propose Rule Amendments Eliminating the Prohibition Against General
Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings (Aug. 29,
2012) [hereinafter Paredes Rule 506 Statement], available at http://sec.gov/news/
speech/2012/spch082912tap.htm (supporting amendments to Regulation D); Daniel
Gallagher, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at SEC Open Meeting:
Proposed Rules To Eliminate the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and
General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings (Aug. 29, 2012)
[hereinafter Gallagher Rule 506 Statement], available at http://sec.gov/news/
speech/2012/spch082912dgm.htm.
46
See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a)(1), 126 Stat. 306 (2012)
(requiring rulemaking no later than ninety days after the Act’s effective date of April
5, 2012, that is, by July 4, 2012); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub L. No. 111-203, § 1502(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (requiring
rulemaking no later than 270 days after the Act’s effective date of July 22, 2010,
that is, by April 17, 2011). The JOBS Act deadline applies to the final rule, whereas
only a proposal was issued on August 29, so the Commission will miss the final
deadline by more than fifty-seven days. The Commission provided for a thirty-day
comment period, and SEC Chairman Schapiro promised that the Commission would
take action “shortly thereafter,” which means adoption of a final rule around October
5, or ninety-four days past the JOBS Act deadline. The Commission had planned to
issue an interim rule without notice and comment but reversed its position under
pressure from investor advocates. See Schapiro’s Boss, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 5, 2012,
7:06 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873234019045781573
92212779684 (describing SEC Chairman Schapiro as “fold[ing] faster than Jerry
Brown in a union negotiation” after discussions with investor advocates); SEC
Announces Additional Delay on General Solicitation Rule Change, CORE
COMPLIANCE & LEGAL SERVICES, http://www.corecls.com/compliance-corner/general/
sec-announces-additional-delay-on-general-solicitation-rule-change (last visited Jan.
8, 2014); Letter from Fund Democracy et al. to Mary Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 15, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-titleii/jobstitleii-59.pdf (noting that issuing an interim rule without public notice and
comment would violate the APA); see also Letter From Fund Democracy et al. to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 16, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-ii/jobstitleii-60.pdf (describing issues for
which costs and benefits must be evaluated pursuant to APA).
47
See Paredes Minerals Statement, supra note 41. Congressman Patrick
McHenry scheduled a hearing to examine Chairman Schapiro’s “failure” to meet the
JOBS Act deadline, which he attributed to her “ideological opposition” to the Act’s
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would increase regulatory burdens, to a high cost-benefit
standard, while holding the deregulatory rulemaking, which
would reduce regulatory burdens, to no cost-benefit standard at
all.48 Nor has either Republican had any objection to the SEC’s
continuing failure to take final action on prior Dodd-Frank Act
mandate to amend the same private offering rules to bar bad
actors from relying on the exemption. The one-year deadline for
that rulemaking passed thirteen months before the Commission
proposed private offering amendments under the JOBS Act.49
The Commissioners’ intermittent advocacy for more rigorous
cost-benefit analysis is far more consistent with libertarian
values than utilitarian ones, which begs the question of why they
do not simply argue from explicitly libertarian principles? One
reason may be that libertarian principles are often associated
with the kind of anti-intellectual populism that is considered
simplistic and extremist in the elite regulatory community.50
mandate. See Letter from Patrick McHenry, Chairman, Subcomm. on TARP, Fin.
Serv. & Bailouts of Pub. & Private Programs, to Mary Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 16, 2012) [hereinafter McHenry Letter], available at
http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/2012-08-16-PMC-to-SchapiroSEC-general-solicitation-due-8-30.pdf; see also Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the AICPA Council Spring Meeting, Washington, D.C.
(May 17, 2012), available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch051712tap.htm
(discussing two topics—the JOBS Act and cost-benefit analysis—without any
mention of cost-benefit issues as related to the JOBS Act).
48
See also McHenry Letter, supra note 47 (“By kicking the can down the road,
you [SEC Chairman Schapiro] are abdicating your responsibility to follow the law,
failing to fulfill your sworn commitment to this Subcommittee, and ignoring the will
of Congress and the President of the United States.”); Paredes Rule 506 Statement,
supra note 45; Gallagher Rule 506 Statement, supra note 45.
49
See Dodd-Frank Act § 926. The Commission proposed amendments on May
25, 2011. See Disqualification of Felons and Other “Bad Actors” from Rule 506
Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9211 (proposed May 25, 2011), available at
http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/2011/33-9211.pdf. In addition, neither Republican
objected to the SEC’s failure to adopt final Dodd-Frank-mandated amendments to
Regulation D’s accredited investor standard until December 21, 2011—more than
eighteen months after the DFA became law—there was no deadline for this
rulemaking. See Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, Securities Act
Release No. 9287 (Dec. 21, 2011), available at http://sec.gov/rules/final/2011/339287.pdf (adopting amendments mandated by section 413(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act
although Commissioner Paredes objected that the proposal did not include a
grandfathering provision); Statement of Troy Paredes, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Remarks at the Open Meeting To Propose Rules Regarding Net Worth
Standard for Accredited Investors (Jan. 25, 2011), available at http://sec.gov/news/
speech/2011/spch012511tap-2.htm.
50
See, e.g., John J. Flynn, The Role of Rules in Antitrust Analysis, 2006 UTAH L.
REV. 605, 612 n.20.
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Individual freedom as an intrinsic value has currency in electoral
politics, but the appointees of politicians who espouse individual
liberty principles do not carry that flag into the regulatory arena.
For example, supporters of crowdfunding and permitting general
solicitation and advertising in private offerings argue that any
resulting economic losses to investors will be small relative to the
economic benefits;51 they generally do not argue that allowing
investors greater individual freedom—even if the result is that
they make bad investment decisions—has intrinsic social value.52
The concept of freedom typically finds its voice in the form of
arguments for “free” markets, which are primarily based on the
utilitarian view that free markets will maximize net social
wealth.53 In other words, it is not the enhanced freedom of
markets, and their participants, that justifies deregulatory
policies, but the capacity of market-directed outcomes to create
greater net social wealth than government-directed outcomes.54
Another reason that libertarian metrics are not openly
embraced in debates about SEC rulemaking is that these metrics
implicitly reject the very raison d’etre of a regulatory agency—to
make public policy in complex fields based on expert evaluation
of social costs and benefits.55 The libertarian metric doubts the
51
Jason Best & Sherwood Neiss, SEC’s Proposed Rule on General Solicitation
Reads, “Sorry…Please Hold…It’s Too Complicated for Us”, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 31,
2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/08/31/secs-proposed-rule-on-general-solicitationreads-sorryplease-hold-its-too-complicated-for-us (“[L]ifting the ban . . . will allow
private companies to raise money from a larger pool of ‘accredited investors.’ ”).
52
It is not only the value of individual liberty that is difficult to quantify; the
reduction in utility caused by the loss of one investment dollar may also depend on
the social context. As Paul Slovic and others, have explained, the social context
surrounding an event can increase the risk that the event presents. See Roger E.
Kasperson et al., The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework, 8 RISK
ANALYSIS 177, 179 (1988). For example, the effect of the Three Mile Island nuclear
reactor accident far exceeded what a cost-benefit analysis would have found was the
risk of such an event. Id. Slovic has argued that the “traditional cost-benefit and risk
analyses neglect the[] higher-order impact[] [caused by social amplification of
loss] . . . (and thereby underestimate the overall risk from the event).” Id.
Incorporating the social amplification of risk into cost-benefit analysis is necessary
to “bring the technical assessment of risk more in line with a fuller determination of
risk.” Id. One example of this theory in action is the social amplification of the risk of
Madoff-like fraud when it results from a regulator’s failure to act on credible tips,
rather than from investors’ own decisions or the absence of specific rules. The risk of
a dollar lost to the former is far greater.
53
See Ian Shapiro, Richard Posner’s Praxis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 999, 1006 (1987).
54
See id.
55
See Michael Ray Harris, Breaking the Grip of the Administrative Triad:
Agency Policy Making Under A Necessity-Based Doctrine, 86 TUL. L. REV. 273, 277
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very capacity of administrative agencies to improve the human
condition through social engineering, as opposed to allowing the
free market to evolve on its own.56 Indeed, many government
officials may be naturally uncomfortable with a libertarian
metric because it undermines the premise of government—that
effective public policy can be derived from public processes.57
Deregulatory SEC Commissioners may feel consciously
compelled to support, or at least not openly undermine, this
premise of public service, or they may unconsciously be prisoners
of a kind of inverted regulatory capture.58
Alternatively, they may see an inconsistency in making
empirical arguments about the cost of regulations while also
arguing for individual liberty—a social utility that defies
empirical analysis. They also may feel more comfortable and/or
believe they may be more effective espousing a mainstream costbenefit analysis. There is no reason to believe that SEC
Commissioners are any less sensitive to peer norms than other
professionals. Indeed, this Article’s discussion of freedom for
freedom’s sake itself operates within the same constraints.
Attempting to inject such an unquantifiable social utility as
individual liberty—or, in contrast, the normative value of liberal,

(2011) (“Agencies are, and always have been, necessary because they are ‘process’
experts: they have the tools available to make complex, and often fluid, regulatory
decisions that the constitutional branches cannot.”).
56
See generally Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative
Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1815–16 (2012)
(discussing dynamics of political-reason giving in administrative decisions).
57
See generally Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1995) (characterizing post-New Deal administrative
state as unconstitutional and inconsistent with separation of powers); Cass R.
Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 446–48
(1987) (discussing failure to incorporate constitutional commitment to checks and
balances into regulatory administration).
58
See Carl Landauer, Deliberating Speed: Totalitarian Anxieties and Postwar
Legal Thought, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 171, 174 (2000) (describing legal scholars’
“internalized attachment to government” and views of “government as efficacious
rather than susceptible to the mood swings of a pathological society” as reflecting a
“confident identification with government”).
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redistributional policies59—into a regulatory debate may be more
likely to be met with polite disdain than afforded serious
consideration.
The foregoing discussion raises the question of whether the
debate about the costs and benefits of the fiduciary duty is beside
the point. The debate may actually be less about the balancing of
quantifiable social utilities than about not only the role, but also
the primacy of libertarian values. Individual liberty could be
viewed as having independent value, as opposed to incorporating
it into the netting of utilities that a more communitarian ethic
assumes. In other words, individual freedom may be viewed as
an incommensurate value that must be considered independently
when making public policy. Under this metric, a public policy
would not be adopted if it reduced individual freedom below some
minimum value, regardless of whether the policy would result in
an increase in net social wealth. Whatever form it takes, the
libertarian metric must be explicitly considered in order to
explore fully the pros and cons of the fiduciary duty.
It is unlikely, however, that we will soon see an SEC study
on the cost of a fiduciary duty as reflected in a reduction in
individual liberty, or a reduction in investor confidence.
Libertarian principles impose implicit constraints on, if not pose
a direct threat to, administrative authority.60 Administrative
agencies will respond to this challenge. One response may be to
shift their regulatory functions to entities that are currently
further from Congress’s reach yet still subject to agency
authority. As discussed below, the result may be that it is not
the Commission that guides the ultimate development of the
fiduciary duty but an agency that it oversees.

59
Although this discussion is focused on the relationship between utilitarian
analysis and libertarian values, the straightjacket of utilitarian cost-benefit analyses
may similarly weaken the position of more communitarian values such as those
reflected in investor protection policies. See Cost-Benefit Hearing, supra note 27, at
70–71, 74–75, 81–82 (statements of Mercer Bullard, Fund Democracy, and
University of Mississippi School of Law, all three discussing derogation in costbenefit analysis of benefits of deterring fraud and misleading sales practices).
60
See Robert P. Murphy, Do Libertarians Have a Problem with Authority?, THE
AM. CONSERVATIVE (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/
articles/should-libertarians-have-a-problem-with-authority/ (stating that “many
people are attracted to libertarianism because they simply don’t like rules”).
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II. THE FINRA FIDUCIARY DUTY
If, as discussed immediately above, agency rulemaking has
been paralyzed by political forces in the form of heightened costbenefit requirements,61 one might look to the development of the
fiduciary duty under sources of law that are not so susceptible to
direct Congressional oversight and judicial power. One such
source of law could be the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (“FINRA”), the self-regulatory organization (“SRO”) for
broker-dealers. FINRA rulemaking and enforcement actions are
not subject to nearly the same degree of accountability to which
the SEC and other agencies are held.62 SEC enforcement actions
and rulemakings are more likely to be challenged than are
FINRA actions.
FINRA is not subject to either the
Administrative Procedures Act or the Freedom of Information
Act and is not subject to any statutory cost-benefit standard.63
61
See Steven Sloan, Cost-Benefit Analysis Puts the Brakes on Dodd-Frank,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 7, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-05-07/
cost-benefit-analysis-puts-the-brakes-on-dodd-frank
(“Business
lobbyists
and
Republican lawmakers who failed to stop the Dodd-Frank Act from becoming law
have managed to put the brakes on many of its provisions a second way: cost-benefit
analysis.”).
62
See Desiderio v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 191 F.3d 198, 206–07 (2d Cir.
1999) (The National Assocation of Securities Dealers (“NASD”), predecessor to
FINRA, is generally not subject to constitutional requirements).
63
However, there are rumblings that suggest that critics of regulation may be
taking aim at FINRA’s independence and/or authority. See Investment Adviser
Oversight Act of 2012, H.R. 4624, 112th Cong. § 203(C)(b)(1) (2012) (proposing
amendments to Investment Advisers Act to create self-regulatory organization for
investment advisers, the rulemaking of which would be subject to APA notice and
comment requirements); Fiero v. FINRA, 660 F.3d 569, 571 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding
that FINRA does not have the power to obtain judicial enforcement of fines imposed
on members); CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS, U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS
COMPETITIVENESS: THE UNFINISHED AGENDA (2011) (arguing that FINRA should be
subject to additional administrative, due process and/or transparency requirements);
Joseph McLaughlin, Is FINRA Constitutional?, 11 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y
PRAC. GROUPS 111 (2011); Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority a Government Agency? (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies Research
Papers, Paper No. 86, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1018396; see also
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010)
(finding unconstitutional the limitation on President’s power to terminate Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) board member). FINRA has
occasionally referred to itself as an “independent” regulator in arguing its ability be
oversee investment advisers who compete with FINRA’s broker-dealer membership,
a claim that may backfire if Congress decides to treat it like any other
administrative agency. See Investment Adviser Oversight Act Hearing, supra note 6,
at 11–13 (statement of Chet Helck, Chairman-Elect, Securities Industry & Financial
Markets Assocation); SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, TESTIMONY OF CHET HELCK,
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Its self-funding frees it from the kind of short-term political
pressure that Congress exerts through its control of the SEC’s
budget. FINRA’s governance structure is less cumbersome than
the SEC’s two-party system, which has evolved to echo the
ideological culture wars more than the disinterested
deliberations of an expert agency.64 These factors give FINRA
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-112-ba-wstatechelck-20120606.pdf
(“ ‘[S]elf-regulatory
organization . . . is
truly
a
misnomer. . . . After many decades of legislation, oversight, and regulation,
regulatory organizations like FINRA are not controlled, or unduly influenced, by the
industry they regulate.”). FINRA and other SROs appear to be enhancing their costbenefit analyses, in part to forestall congressional action. See Nick Paraskeva, U.S.
Self-Regulatory Bodies Move Toward Cost-Benefit Analysis, REUTERS (Oct. 9 2012),
http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2012/10/09/u-s-self-regulatorybodies-move-toward-cost-benefit-analysis/; Suzanne Barlyn, FINRA To Ramp Up
Scrutiny of Costs, Benefits of Rules, REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/25/us-finra-costs-idUSBRE88O1AH2012092
5; Mark Schoeff, FINRA’s ‘Independent Regulator’ Label Gets Closer Scrutiny During
SRO Debate, INVESTMENT NEWS (Aug. 15, 2012, 3:08 PM), http://www.investment
news.com/article/20120815/BLOG07/120819943#.
64
For example, it has become standard practice for minority Republican
Commissioners to file public dissents from rulemakings based on, inter alia,
concerns regarding the adequacy of the SEC’s cost-benefit analysis that, to a large
extent, reflect fundamentally differing views regarding the specific role of the
Commission and the broader utility of administrative law and agencies. See, e.g.,
Gallagher Rule 506 Statement, supra note 44 (opposing conflict minerals rule);
Paredes Minerals Statement, supra note 41 (opposing conflict minerals rule); Troy A.
Paredes, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open Meeting To Adopt Final
Rule Regarding Conflict Minerals Pursuant to Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act
(Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch082510tap.
htm (opposing proxy access rule); Kathleen Casey, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Statement at Open Meeting To Adopt Amendments Regarding Facilitating
Shareholder Director Nominations (Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/2010/spch082510klc.htm (opposing proxy access rule); Troy A. Paredes,
Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opening Remarks and Dissent Regarding Final Rule
151A Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts (Dec. 17, 2008),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch121708tap.htm (opposing
equity-indexed annuities rule); Paul S. Atkins, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Statement by SEC Commissioner Regarding Investment Company Governance
Proposal (June 23, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch062304
psa.htm (opposing investment company governance rules); Cynthia A. Glassman,
Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement by SEC Commissioner Regarding
Investment Company Governance Proposal (June 23, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch062304cag.htm (opposing investment company
governance rules); see also Statement of Casey & Paredes, supra note 24 (criticizing
Section 913 Study). Intra-Commission conflict recently reached a boiling point when
SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro, an independent, felt compelled to issue a public
statement taking her fellow Republican and Democratic Commissioners to task for
not supporting her position on money market fund regulation and calling for another
regulatory agency to intercede, see Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement
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much greater freedom than the Commission to impose a fiduciary
duty on broker-dealers when providing personalized, retail
investment advice, and advice in other situations.
Thus,
resolving the debate about broker-dealer conduct standards may
have more to do with choosing the source of law—government
agency or SRO—than establishing the particular scope or
substance of the fiduciary duty.65
In fact, while the debate regarding the fiduciary duty has
been focused on the SEC’s and DOL’s efforts, FINRA has been
steadily establishing a foundation for imposing a fiduciary duty
on the same broker–dealers to which a fiduciary rule under
Dodd-Frank Section 913 would apply. FINRA regulations have
long included a strong fiduciary element. The Commission
described FINRA rules as “embod[ying] basic fiduciary
responsibilities”
almost
twenty-five
years
ago,66
a
characterization that has gained purchase ever since.
As a general matter, FINRA members are subject to broad
fairness standards that are structurally akin to the principlesbased fiduciary duty.67 For example, FINRA Rule 2010 requires
of SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro on Money Market Fund Reform (Aug. 22, 2012),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-166.htm, which was followed
by counter-statements released by the Democratic Commissioner and two
Republican Commissioners with whom she disagreed, see Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r,
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement Regarding Money Market Funds (Aug. 23, 2012),
http://sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch082312laa.htm; Troy A. Paredes & Daniel M.
Gallagher, Comm’rs, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on the Regulation of Money
Market Funds (Aug. 28, 2012), http://sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch082812dmgtap.
htm.
65
Even under a section 913 rulemaking, FINRA could still become the primary
source of law as to broker-dealers’ fiduciary duties. See MERCER BULLARD, AARP
PUB. POLICY INST., PROTECTING INVESTORS—ESTABLISHING THE SEC FIDUCIARY
DUTY STANDARD 17 (2011), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ppi/cons-prot/
rr2011-02.pdf.
66
E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., Securities Act Release No. 34-25887, 1988 WL
901859, at *4 (July 6, 1988).
67
See, e.g., N.Y. Stock Exch. Rule 2020 (2009) (“No member . . . shall effect any
transaction in, or induce the purchase or sale of, any security by means of any
manipulative, deceptive or other fraudulent device or contrivance.”); FINRA Rule
2210(d)(1)(A), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?
rbid=2403&element_id=10648 (requiring that communications with the public be
“based on principles of fair dealing and good faith, must be fair and balanced, and
must provide a sound basis for evaluating the facts in regard to any particular
security or type of security, industry, or service”); FINRA Rule 5121, available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=945
6 (requiring participants in public offerings to disclose prominently conflicts of
interest); FINRA Rule 5110(b)(4)(C), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/
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that members “observe high standards of commercial honor and
just and equitable principles of trade.”68 In some circumstances,
broker-dealers’ duties are explicitly fiduciary, such as when
executing customer transactions.69 Other rules impose a broad
principles-based standard and specific conduct requirements,
which effectively couples a non-fiduciary conduct rule with a
fiduciary-like overlay. For example, principal transactions with
customers must be effected at prices that are “fair, taking into
consideration all relevant circumstances”70—a facts-andcircumstances, fiduciary-like standard—and not exceed a five
percent mark-up or -down limit—a bright-line, rule-based,
nonfiduciary standard.71 Adding a further fiduciary gloss, a
mark-up or -down of five percent or less still “may be considered
unfair or unreasonable,” depending on the particular facts and
circumstances.72
The closest cousin in broker-dealer regulation to a Section
913 fiduciary standard is FINRA’s suitability rule.
The
suitability rule requires that members have a “reasonable basis
to believe that a recommended transaction or investment
strategy” is suitable for the retail customer “based on the
information obtained through the [member’s] reasonable

display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=6831 (prohibiting participation
in underwriting in which arrangements are “unfair or unreasonable”).
68
FINRA Rule 2010, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_
main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=5504.
69
See Order Execution Obligations, Exchange Act Release No. 37619A, 1996
WL 506154 (Sept. 6, 1996) (“A broker-dealer's duty of best execution derives from
common law agency principles and fiduciary obligations, and is incorporated both in
SRO rules and, through judicial and Commission decisions, in the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws.”); FINRA Rule 5310(a)(1), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=104
55 (requiring members to “use reasonable diligence to ascertain the best market for
the subject security and buy or sell in such market so that the resultant price to the
customer is as favorable as possible under prevailing market conditions”).
70
NASD Rule 2440, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_
main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3660.
71
NASD Rule IM–2440–1, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/
display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3661.
72
Id. FINRA has frequently found markups of less than five percent to be
excessive. See Dan Jamieson, FINRA Backtracks on Plan To End 5% Markup Rule,
INVESTMENT NEWS (Feb. 10, 2013), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/201302
04/FREE/130209979 (commentator noting FINRA settlements involving three
percent markups).
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diligence . . . to ascertain the customer’s investment profile.”73 A
“customer’s investment profile” includes the customer’s age,
other investments, financial situation and needs, other
enumerated factors, and “any other information the customer
may [choose] to disclose.”74
The suitability rule has been criticized by fiduciary
advocates for not requiring that a recommendation be in the
customer’s best interests, but only that it be suitable.75 Thus, for
a customer for whom a variable annuity was “suitable” a brokerdealer could recommend the variable annuity that paid him the
highest compensation as opposed to the one that would be in the
customer’s best interests, as discussed above. Yet suitability
goes some distance down the fiduciary road by establishing a
qualitative test for investment advice that mandates that it be
consistent with clients’ best interests, if not necessarily that it be
the best option.76 It is, again, the kind of principles-based, factdependent conduct standard that reflects the structure of a
fiduciary standard more than that of a specific conduct rule.
FINRA recently adopted a new suitability rule77 that, in two
primary respects, moves the suitability standard closer to a
fiduciary standard.78 First, in a number of ways, the new rule
contemplates evaluating broker-dealer conduct in the context of

73
FINRA Rule 2111, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_
main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859 (formerly NASD Rule 2310). There is a
parallel NYSE rule—the “know your customer” rule—that became a FINRA rule in
2011 following the merger of the two regulators in 2007. See FINRA Rule 2090,
available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&
element_id=9858 (formerly NYSE Rule 405) (“Every member shall use reasonable
diligence, in regard to the opening and maintenance of every account, to know (and
retain) the essential facts concerning every customer and concerning the authority of
each person acting on behalf of such customer.”).
74
FINRA Rule 2111.
75
See BULLARD, supra note 65, at 6.
76
See id. at 6–7.
77
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 34-63325,
75 Fed. Reg. 71,479 (Nov. 23, 2010) (SEC release approving FINRA Rule 2111,
effective July 9, 2012).
78
See Seth Lipner, The New FINRA Suitability Rules, 1969 PLI/CORP 173, 192
(Aug. 2, 2012) (on file with author) (FINRA’s new suitability rule does not impose a
fiduciary duty but “brings FINRA closer to imposing such a standard on brokers”);
Duane Thompson, FINRA’s Quasi–Fiduciary Rule, FI360 BLOG (July 11, 2012),
http://www.fi360.com/blog; Christina N. Davilas et al., FINRA Issues Additional
Guidance on Its New Suitability Rule, 4 FIN. FRAUD L. REP. 795, 799–800 (2012)
(FINRA “[a]nnounces a New, ‘Best Interests of the Client’ Standard” that “may be
viewed as akin to a fiduciary duty.”).
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the kind of comprehensive, ongoing advisory relationship with
customers that is more akin to a fiduciary relationship.79 For
example, FINRA expanded the rule to cover not only
recommendations, but also “investment strategies,” which
include situations in which a security or strategy is
recommended, regardless of whether a transaction takes place.80
Along with the rule’s expansion to cover “hold” recommendations,
the inclusion of investment strategies expands the kind of
recommendations covered by the rule well beyond the
transactional advice that has been the core of the suitability
rule.81
FINRA’s assertion of authority over transactions that may
involve non-securities, such as equity-indexed annuities, homeequity loans, and viatical settlements,82 has further extended the
suitability rule beyond transactions in securities to encompass, at
least indirectly, virtually every form of financial advice.83 FINRA
has stated that broker-dealers must design their supervisory
procedures to detect, investigate, and follow–up on “ ‘red flags’
indicating that a broker may have recommended an unsuitable

79
See Melanie Waddell, FINRA’s New Suitability Rule Edges Closer to
‘Fiduciary’: NAPFA Chairman, ADVISORONE (July 16, 2012), http://www.advisor
one.com/2012/07/16/finras-new-suitability-rule-edges-closer-to-fiduci.
80
See FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12-25, Suitability: Additional Guidance on
FINRA’s New Suitability Rule (2012); FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12-55, Suitability:
Guidance on FINRA’s Suitabilty Rule (2012) (modifying FINRA Regulatory Notice
12-25).
81
See Kenneth Corbin, FSI Wary of Investment Strategy, Hold Provisions in
FINRA Suitability Rule, FINANCIAL PLANNING (July 9, 2012), http://www.financialplanning.com/news/fsi-wary-of-investment-strategy-hold-provisions-in-finrasuitability-rule-2679753-1.html (Comments of David Bellaire, General Counsel and
Director of Government Affairs, Financial Services Institute, regarding suitability
rule’s coverage of hold recommendations: “ ‘It’s very easy for firms to monitor a
transaction . . . . Things happen—products are purchased or sold.’ But ‘the
recommendation to hold is a situation where suitability rules now apply in which
there is no clear moment, no resulting transaction.’ ”).
82
See FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12-25; FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12-55. The
term “viatical settlement” refers to the sale of a life insurance policy to a third party.
83
See generally Mercer Bullard, The Future of Financial Planning Regulation,
MORNINGSTAR.COM (July 7, 2011), http://ibd.morningstar.com/article/article.asp?id=
386262&CN=brf295,http://ibd.morningstar.com/archive/archive.asp?inputs=days=14
;frmtId=12,%20brf295.
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investment strategy with both a security and non-security
component,”84 which further extends the reach of investment
strategies category discussed above.
FINRA’s interpretation of the new rule seems to portend a
broker-dealer duty to monitor customer accounts on an ongoing
basis.85 An ongoing duty to monitor an account makes brokers’
services more closely resemble the kind of ongoing relationship of
trust and confidence that is characteristic of a fiduciary
relationship, in contrast with the services of a salesperson who
only makes a one-time recommendation.86 FINRA’s January
2011 guidance on the new suitability rule states that the brokerdealer must “know its customers not only at account opening but
also throughout the life of its relationship with customers in
order to, among other things, effectively service and supervise
the customers’ accounts.”87 It refers further to the need to verify
essential facts about customers “at intervals reasonably
calculated to prevent and detect any mishandling of a customer’s
account that might result from the customer’s change in
circumstances” and reminds broker-dealers of their obligation
under Exchange Act Rule 17a–3 to “attempt to update certain
account information every 36 months regarding accounts for
which the broker-dealers were required to make suitability
determinations.”88 These pointed assertions of an ongoing duty
to update information imply a developing affirmative duty to
84

FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12-25, at 8; see, e.g., NFP Securities, Inc., FINRA
Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent, FINRA Case No. 2007011393902 (Mar.
28, 2011) (settling for failing to supervise of equity-indexed annuities).
85
See De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293, 1302 (2d Cir.
2002) (broker-dealer ordinarily has no duty to monitor a non-discretionary account).
86
See Press v. Chemical Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1999)
(broker-client fiduciary duty is limited “to the narrow task of consummating the
transaction requested”). Conversely, the Department has proposed to expand the
definition of “fiduciary” under ERISA to include not only persons who provide
investment advice on a “regular basis” but also to those who provide advice
regarding a single transaction. See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”, supra note 3.
87
FINRA, Regulatory Notice 11-02, Know Your Customer and Suitability: SEC
Approves Consolidated FINRA Rules Governing Know-Your-Customer and
Suitability
Obligations
(2011).
Interestingly,
Dodd-Frank’s
rulemaking
authorization expressly prohibited a rule that required a broker-dealer to have a
continuing duty of care or loyalty to the customer after providing personalized
investment advice about securities, see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No. 111-203, § 913(g)(1), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), yet
FINRA’s interpretation of the new suitability rule seems to apply to certain
customer relationships and entails precisely such a relationship.
88
FINRA, Regulatory Notice 11-02.

FINAL_BULLARD

2013]

2/27/2014 6:20 PM

FIDUCIARY STANDARD: IT’S NOT WHAT IT IS

361

update prior recommendations periodically and make new
recommendations based on changed circumstances as
appropriate. Although other FINRA guidance creates some
doubt as to FINRA’s direction in this respect,89 it appears that, at
a minimum, FINRA has put the suitability rule on a path of
requiring that broker-dealers assume greater responsibility for
the longer-term effects of their transaction and investment
strategy recommendations.
Thus, FINRA’s comments about ongoing monitoring and its
authority over non-securities transactions, combined with the
expansion of the suitability rule to cover both hold
recommendations and investment strategies, reflect a rule that is
decidedly moving toward a fiduciary duty.
The foregoing
changes, like FINRA’s addition of “age, investment experience,
time horizon, liquidity needs and risk tolerance” to the list of
factors that broker-dealers must consider in developing a
customer’s investment profile, envision something more akin to a
full-blown financial planning relationship than an intermittent
transactional relationship.90 At the same time that financial
89

FINRA states that recommendations normally do “not create an ongoing duty
to monitor and make subsequent recommendations.” FINRA, Regulatory Notice 1225, at 7; FINRA, Regulatory Notice 11-25, Know Your Customer and Suitability:
New Implementation Date for and Additional Guidance on the Consolidated FINRA
Rules Governing Know-Your-Customer Suitability Obligations (2011). Further
obscuring its January 2011 guidance, FINRA stated that a broker who meets with a
customer for a quarterly or annual review and “remains silent regarding, or refrains
from recommending the sale of, securities” would not be subject to the rule, even if
the broker had “previously recommended the purchase of the securities.” Id. The
rule would apply if the broker made an express recommendation to hold the
securities, which seems to create an incentive to avoid potential suitability liability
by saying nothing, even when the customer should sell—although private liability
risk arising from silence might counsel otherwise. FINRA explains that explicit hold
recommendations should be covered because they “constitute the type of advice upon
which a customer can be expected to rely.” Id. However, the same reliance is likely to
arise when a broker is silent during a customer account review meeting when there
are securities that should be sold. It is unclear how FINRA will resolve these
incongruities.
90
See Corbin, supra note 81 (Comments of David Bellaire, General Counsel and
Director of Government Affairs, Financial Services Institute, regarding suitability
rule’s coverage of non-securities and investment strategies: “ ‘[I]t’s questionable
whether that’s a fair requirement for firms to be experts on things outside of their
business’. . . . ‘That goes far afield from the business that our members are engaged
in of selling securities and monitoring the suitability of those securities,’ . . . warning
that the rule sets ‘no outside limit’ on what constitutes a covered investment
strategy.”). Ironically, in 2005 the Commission adopted a rule, later vacated by the
D.C. Circuit, under which such financial planning services could have required a
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planning organizations have pressed for separate regulation of
financial planning as such,91 FINRA has moved aggressively to
create and occupy that field on its own and its efforts have not
gone unnoticed by the financial planning community.92 Through
rulemaking—by text and interpretation—FINRA has expanded:
(1) the idea of “suitability” to reflect the broader context in which
broker-dealers advertise and deliver retail financial services, and
(2) the suitability rule to impose a standard approaching the
fiduciary standard that traditionally has applied to such advisory
services.
The second way in which the suitability rule has moved
toward a fiduciary standard is by FINRA’s position that the new
rule entails a de facto requirement that broker-dealers
reasonably believe not only that their recommendations are
suitable, but also that they are in the best interests of their
customers.93 There is no question that the fiduciary duty
applicable to advisers continues to be a higher standard, in part
because it requires that recommendations be suitable and that
broker-dealer to register under the Advisers Act. See generally Black, supra note 20,
at 48–49.
91
See Press Release, Certified Fin. Planner Bd., Financial Planning Coalition
Announces Support for Professional Regulation of Financial Planners (Apr. 27,
2009), available at http://www.cfp.net/news-events/news-release-archive/article/2009/
04/27 (The financial planning community has asked Congress to enact legislation
specifically regulating the financial planning industry.). This effort was
unsuccessful, but section 919C of the Dodd-Frank Act did require the U.S.
Government Accountability Office to study the oversight and regulation of financial
planers. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-235, REGULATORY
COVERAGE GENERALLY EXISTS FOR FINANCIAL PLANNERS, BUT CONSUMER
PROTECTION ISSUES REMAIN 1 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1
1235.pdf; see also Bullard, supra note 4 (critiquing GAO study).
92
In 2009, the Financial Planning Association complained to the Commission
that FINRA had exceeded its jurisdiction by bringing an enforcement action against
a broker-dealer for offering misleading financial plans. See Letter from Richard
Salmen, President, Fin. Planning Ass’n, to Mary Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n (Aug. 17, 2009) (citing Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth.,
Ameritas Fined $100,000 for Use of Misleading College Funding Plans To Sell
Variable Life Products (Aug. 6, 2009), available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/
NewsReleases/2009/P119744), available at http://www.fpanet.org/docs/assets/29F7D
0C5-1D09-67A1-AC1B0DBAFF454BCE/SchapiroLetterFINRAEnforcement081709
final.pdf; see also Letter from David Becker, Gen. Counsel, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to
Richard Salmen, President, Fin. Planning Ass’n (Aug. 27, 2009), available at
http://www.fpanet.org/docs/assets/85DA73EB-1D09-67A1-7A4156FADA6BF5D2/829
09SECresponse.pdf (responding to FPA letter).
93
See Davilas et al., supra note 78, at 800 (“[FINRA’s] reading a fiduciary duty
requirement into the suitability rule marks another attempted significant expansion
of FINRA’s regulatory authority over broker-dealers.”).
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conflicts of interest be fully disclosed, whereas broker-dealers
generally have not been required to disclose conflicts of interest.94
However, FINRA has applied a strong fiduciary gloss to the
“consistent with the best interests of [investors]” formulation in
its most recent interpretive guidance on the suitability rule.95 In
some respects, the suitability standard reaches the same result
as the “act in the best interests of the [customer]” standard that
appears in Dodd-Frank Section 913 and in cases applying the
fiduciary duty under the Investment Advisers Act.96
94
See Suitability of Investment Advice Provided by Investment Advisers,
Custodial Account Statements for Certain Advisory Clients, Advisers Act Release
No. 1406, 1994 WL 84902, at *2 (Mar. 22, 1994) (“Investment advisers are
fiduciaries who owe their clients a series of duties, one of which is the duty to
provide only suitable investment advice.”); ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., RAND INST. FOR
CIVIL JUSTICE, INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS
AND BROKER-DEALERS 13 (2008) (“[T]he kernel of the fiduciary obligations that
investment advisers owe to clients is to refrain from any undisclosed conflicts of
interest, a requirement that constrains only some broker-dealers. In addition, even
for those requirements that appear similar to those for broker-dealers, violation may
be viewed as much more significant.”); MICHAEL KOFFLER, THE BRAVE NEW WORLD
OF FIDUCIARY DUTY FOR BROKER-DEALERS AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS 13, 24 (2010)
(subjecting broker-dealers to a fiduciary duty would require that they disclose the
revenue sharing payments). Contra Barbara Black, How To Improve Retail Investor
Protection After the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 13
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 59, 86 (2010) (“There is little support, either in the law or
regulatory guidance, for this distinction” between suitability and fiduciary
obligations). Cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 196–97
(1963) (fiduciary duty under section 206 of Advisers Act requires full disclosure of
material conflicts of interest). Compare Focus Point Solutions, Inc., Release No.
3458, 2012 WL 3863221, at *1–2 (ALJ Sept. 6, 2012) (settling charges that
investment adviser violated section 206(2) of Advisers Act by failing to disclose
revenue sharing payments to client), with Benzon v. Morgan Stanley Distribs., Inc.,
420 F.3d 598, 612 (6th Cir. 2005) (broker-dealer has no duty to disclose that Class B
shares of mutual fund are never the best option for shareholders or that it received
greater compensation for selling Class B shares), and Press v. Quick & Reilly, Inc.,
218 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2000) (broker-dealer not required to disclose mutual fund 12b1 fees), and Morgan Stanley & Van Kampen Mut. Fund Sec. Litig., 2006 WL 108183,
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2006) (“Form N-1A requires the disclosure of the total fees
paid by the investor in connection with a securities purchase, as well as total
commissions paid by the fund, but it does not require disclosure of how differential
compensation is allocated. Nor does it require disclosure of the sales contests or
management bonuses.”). The foregoing decisions in Benzon, Press and Morgan
Stanley have not deterred the SEC’s enforcement division from bringing antifraud
charges against and obtaining settlements with broker-dealers for failing to disclose
revenue sharing payments. See Bullard, supra note 4, at 183 n.40.
95
See FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12-25, Suitability: Additional Guidance on
FINRA’s New Suitability Rule 3–4 (2012).
96
In some cases, FINRA panels have interpreted the suitability rule to require
that broker-dealers “act in the best interests of the client,” rather than merely
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FINRA’s interpretation of the rule has made the “consistent
with the best interests” standard essentially fiduciary in nature
with respect to situations where a broker-dealer may be
motivated to recommend one suitable investment over another in
order to increase the broker-dealer’s compensation. This is the
same sale-motivated-by-compensation fact pattern found in the
sale of variable annuities, which the fiduciary standard reaches
but the suitability standard may fail to cover, according to
fiduciary advocates.97 FINRA’s interpretation of the “consistent
with the best interests” standard implies a duty of care, rather
than a duty of loyalty, that may achieve the practical effect of a
disclosure-based fiduciary duty.
In its recent reinterpretation of the suitability rule, FINRA
interpreted the “consistent with” formulation to “prohibit[] a
broker from placing his or her interests ahead of the customer’s
interests.”98 As examples, FINRA listed a series of suitability
cases in which a broker-dealer’s recommendation was allegedly
motivated by the prospect of higher compensation.99 It treated
the suitability of the recommendation as separate from the
question of whether “the broker [was] placing his or her interests
ahead of the customer’s interests,” reflecting the view that an
improperly motivated recommendation could violate the
suitability rule even if the recommended investment was
suitable.100
The cases cited by FINRA reflect a mix of rules and
allegations that make it difficult to pinpoint the legal standard
being applied.
For example, a case in which a broker
recommended transactions that triggered unnecessary additional
fees, both suitability violations and violations of the more general

“consistent with” the client’s best interests. See, e.g., Willard, Disciplinary
Proceeding No. 2006006046401, at 16 (FINRA Dec. 18, 2009), available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@adj/documents/ohodecisions/p12
0850.pdf (relying on Dunbar, Disciplinary Proceeding No. C07050050, at 11 (FINRA,
May 20, 2008), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@adj/
documents/ohodecisions/p018501.pdf (using the “consistent with the customer’s best
interests” formulation).
97
See, e.g., Roper Testimony, supra note 20, at 7.
98
See FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12-25, at 3–4.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 4 (A broker is not obligated to recommend the least expensive security,
“as long as the recommendation is suitable and the broker is not placing his or her
interests ahead of the customer’s interests.”).
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“fair dealing” and “commercial honor” rules were involved.101
Indeed, FINRA’s discussion of the “consistent with” standard
includes a long citation to general misconduct rules and other
rules that “provide broad and significant protections to
investors”—that is, broad enforcement authority—as if to remind
FINRA members of the breadth of FINRA’s authority to bring
principles-based enforcement actions that might be considered
outside of the scope of a strict reading of the suitability rule.102
Regardless of whether transactions that are suitable, but
compensation-motivated, violate the suitability rule, the
fiduciary-like flexibility of other FINRA rules, in combination
with FINRA’s interpretive discretion as an SRO, make such
transactions actionable. This standard continues to lack the
failure-to-disclose claim that a fiduciary duty would provide, and
it is still an open question as to how well FINRA’s duty of care
will weather challenges in courts—or before a more libertarian
Commission—that may be less inclined than a FINRA panel to
defer to a regulator’s rate-setting views regarding when expenses
are so high as to make a recommendation unsuitable.103
101

See Epstein, Exchange Act Release No. 34-59328, 2009 WL 223611, at *21
(Jan. 30, 2009) (upholding FINRA disciplinary decision finding suitability violation
based on improper mutual fund switching and violations of fair dealing and
commercial honor rules); see also Sathianathan, Exchange Act Release No. 34-54722,
2006 WL 3228694, at *15 (Nov. 8, 2006), aff’d, 304 F. App’x 883 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(finding suitability and fair dealing violations in part based on a recommendation to
invest in a higher cost class of mutual fund shares); Faber, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-49216, 2004 WL 239507, at *7 (Feb. 10, 2004) (upholding the FINRA
disciplinary decision finding unsuitable recommendations and violations of antifraud
and commercial honor rules); Belden, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47859, 2003 WL
21088079, at *5 (May 14, 2003) (upholding FINRA disciplinary decision finding
suitability violation based on sales of higher-cost classes of mutual fund shares and
violations of commercial honor rules); Evans, Complaint No. 2006005977901 9–11
(FINRA Oct. 3, 2011), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/
documents/nacdecisions/p124603.pdf (finding that excessive and inappropriate
trading violated suitability, excessive trading and commercial honor rules). Cf. 1st
Global Capital Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 34-54754, 2006 WL 3313842, at *7
(Nov. 15, 2006) (settling the proceeding based on MSRB fair dealing (G-17) and
suitability (G-19) rules and taking the position that recommending highest cost class
of 529 shares violated fair dealing and suitability rules).
102
See generally FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12-25, at n.23 (citing FINRA Rules
1014, 1021, 1031, 2010, 2090, 2210, 2330, 2360, 2370, 3010 and 5310) (stating
“[t]hese (and many other) FINRA rules provide broad and significant protections to
investors”).
103
For example, no court has ever ruled in favor of plaintiffs who alleged that
fees charged by a mutual fund were excessive in violation of the fiduciary duty in
section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act. See Mercer E. Bullard, Dura, Loss
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However, FINRA is already deeply engaged in forms of ratesetting in other contexts104 and openly refers to part of its
suitability rule as including a “quantitative” suitability
standard.105 FINRA’s under the radar status as a regulator may
permit it to expand a “quantitative” suitability duty of care to
make up much of the ground that a Section 913 fiduciary duty
would cover.106
The incorporation of compensation-motivated claims in
suitability cases places broker-dealers in a difficult position. Any
situation in which a broker-dealer may receive different
compensation
amounts
for
implementing
different
recommendations, which is the norm in the context of
recommendations involving mutual funds and variable
annuities,107 automatically begins to build the foundation for a
suitability claim based on the recommendation having been
compensation-motivated. A broker-dealer might defend on the
ground that the transaction was suitable, the differential
compensation was disclosed and/or the customer consented, but
none of these arguments is a defense to a FINRA claim that the
recommendation was, in fact, motivated by higher
compensation.108 Alternatively, the broker-dealer could revise
compensation arrangements so that its compensation—and any
nonmonetary benefits or burdens—did not vary based on the
particular security recommended. This “level fee” model mirrors
Causation, and Mutual Funds: A Requiem for Private Claims?, 76 U. CIN. L. REV.
559, 559–60, n.5 (2008).
104
See, e.g., FINRA Rule IM-2440-2, available at http://finra.complinet.com/
en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3662 (limiting markups and
markdowns to five percent); FINRA Rule 2830(d)(1), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=369
1 (limiting mutual fund commissions to 8.5%); FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12-25, at
14 & nn.66–67 (citing specific turnover rates and cost-to-equity ratios in evaluating
churning claims).
105
FINRA Rule 2111 cmt. .05, Components of Suitability Obligations, available
at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=
9859.
106
See Davilas et al., supra note 78 (FINRA interpretation “[p]rovides that the
suitability obligation includes a requirement to act in the ‘best interests of the
client,’ seemingly pre-empting any rulemaking by the SEC pursuant to The DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (‘Dodd-Frank’) that brokerdealers are subject to a generalized fiduciary duty.”).
107
See, e.g., Revenue Sharing from Mutual Fund Families, PRIMERICA, http://
shareholder.primerica.com/public/shareholder/rev_share_disc.html (last visited Jan.
10, 2014).
108
See discussion supra notes 98–100.
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the approach taken under ERISA in permitted plan fiduciaries to
provide beneficiaries with conflicted advice.109 Another defense
would be for broker-dealers to document the reasons that a
particular higher-compensation recommendation was the best
option for the customer, that is, to adopt a de facto fiduciary “best
interests” standard.
FINRA supports imposing a fiduciary duty on broker-dealers
with respect to personalized, retail investment advice110 and
appears to intend to continue moving the suitability standard
further in that direction. FINRA’s Vice Chairman has stated
that FINRA intends, before any SEC rulemaking under Section
913, to “begin implementing changes to move the standard
forward” toward a fiduciary duty, including a proposal to require
a disclosure document similar to the Form ADV required under
the Advisers Act.111 FINRA views this disclosure document as a
stepping stone toward a fiduciary standard. [FINRA] supports
the three principles FINRA believes are fundamental to a
fiduciary relationship: avoiding conflicts where possible; fully
disclosing conflicts that do exist; and taking actions that are in
the best interests of customers.112

This requirement to take actions that “are in” a customer’s
best interests, rather than merely “consistent with” those
interests, echoes Section 913’s formulation of the fiduciary
standard. FINRA has an incentive to further embrace the

109
See Investment Advice—Participants and Beneficiaries, 76 Fed. Reg. 66,135,
66,139 (Oct. 25, 2011) (adopting rule permitting investment advice otherwise
prohibited by ERISA where adviser’s fees do not vary based on the investment
option selected).
110
See Investment Adviser Oversight Act Hearing, supra note 6, at 13 (statement
of Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority).
111
Stephen Luparello, Vice Chairman, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Remarks
at the FSI Advocacy Summit (Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://www.finra.org/
Newsroom/Speeches/Luparello/P124599; see FINRA, Regulatory Notice 10-54,
Disclosure of Services, Conflicts and Duties (2010).
112
Luparello, supra note 111.
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fiduciary standard in order to strengthen its case to become the
self-regulatory organization for investment advisers,113 a goal
toward which it made significant strides in 2011.114
The possibility that the fiduciary debate will be played out
based not on SEC rulemaking but on FINRA’s evolving standards
may reflect a broader dynamic in the evolution of administrative
law. Financial services, like other heavily regulated industries,
have become more complex at an accelerating rate.115 The
agencies that oversee these industries may no longer have the
knowledge or flexibility to adapt adequately to the speed of
innovation. At the same time, agencies have increasingly been
burdened with procedural requirements and political
interference that further limit their ability to keep pace with the
markets that they regulate, as discussed above. Government
agencies have increasingly found their rulemaking initiatives
paralyzed by internal and external political gridlock. This
characterization aptly describes the current state of both the
SEC’s position on the fiduciary duty, where it cannot even
achieve sufficient internal consensus to release a request for
information on the costs and benefits of a fiduciary
rulemaking116—after already failing to achieve consensus on the
release of the staff’s Section 913 Study—and the Department of
Labor’s fiduciary duty proposal, where a cost-benefit information
request was released only to trigger an angry response from
members of the President’s own party.117
113
See Dan Jamieson, New FINRA Suitability Rule Worries B-Ds, INVESTMENT
NEWS (July 8, 2012, 9:58 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20120708/
REG/307089984 (“Mr. [Hardy] Callcott [partner at Bingham McCutchen, LLP]
thinks that Finra is trying to get a jump on overseeing a fiduciary duty in an
attempt to bolster its case for getting oversight of advisers.”).
114
See generally Investment Adviser Oversight Act of 2012, H.R. 4624, 112th
Cong. (2012).
115
Noreen Clancy et al., Complexity of Financial Services Industry Makes It
Difficult for Individual Investors To Distinguish Broker-Dealers and Investment
Advisers, RAND CORP. (Jan. 3, 2008), http://www.rand.org/news/press/2008/01/03.
html; Felix Salmon, Why Finance Can’t Be Fixed with Better Regulation, REUTERS
BLOG (July 23, 2010, 12:24), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2012/07/23/whyfinance-cant-be-fixed-with-better-regulation.
116
See Letter from Mary Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Scott
Garrett, Chairman, Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t-Sponsored Entities, House
of Representatives (Jan. 10, 2012), available at http://www.bdamerica.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/SEC-response-to-GARRETT-Section-913-follow-up-2.pdf
(stating that SEC staff was drafting a request for data “specific to the provision of
retail financial [investment] advice”).
117
See Cost-Benefit Hearing, supra note 27, at 2.
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Independent agencies such as the Commission may have no
choice but to surrender a broader range of policymaking to quasigovernmental, or quasi-private, entities that operate one degree
further from the zone of political conflicts. This could be a shortterm shift that only responds to the current climate of
heightened political polarization.118 Or it may reflect a longerterm, natural evolution of the modern administrative state to
policymaking arenas that are further removed from political
processes and closer to quasi-private structures.119 One could
crudely posit four epochs in this evolution: (1) From the pre-1900
absence of governmental regulatory mechanisms during the birth
of free market economies, (2) to the rise of legislative regulatory
initiatives from 1900–1932, (3) to the delegation by legislatures
to agencies from 1933–2000, (4) to the delegation by legislatures
and agencies to quasi-private, self-regulatory forms from 2000
onward. Perhaps we are living in the age of the Fifth Branch.120
III. THE PRIVATE FIDUCIARY DUTY
The foregoing analysis discusses the fiduciary debate in the
context of a public duty, yet fiduciary claims, and their close
cousin suitability claims, are addressed far more often in private
litigation than in public enforcement actions.121 FINRA brought
118
See Nolan McCarty et al., Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and
Unequal Riches 3 (Ctr. on Insts. & Governance, Working Paper No. 5, 2005),
available at http://igovberkeley.com/sites/default/files/No5_McCarty.pdf (voting
patterns show increase in relative divergence of Republicans’ and Democrats’ voting
patterns). See generally A.E. Dick Howard, The Constitution and the Role of
Government, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 449, 489–94 (2012) (comparing consensus at the
inception of the administrative state with current political polarization).
119
See Mercer Bullard, Caremark’s Irrelevance, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 15, 22
(2013) (discussing role of corporate form as a kind of self-regulatory structure).
120
Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L REV. 573, 579 (1984). This evolution could just
as well be characterized as the dismantling of the Fourth Branch, with the advent of
self-regulation representing a return to a tripartite, limited federal government. See
Short, supra note 11, at 674–75 (finding positive correlation between expressions of
concern that regulation is coercive and support for self-regulatory structures). Cf.
Sunstein, supra note 57. See generally FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (administrative agencies “have become a veritable fourth
branch of the Government, which has deranged our three-branch legal theories
much as the concept of a fourth dimension unsettles our three-dimensional
thinking”); Lawson, supra note 57.
121
Compare Clifford Kirsch et al., Understanding FINRA’s Suitability Rules:
Possible Enforcement Actions, FINANCIAL PLANNING BLOGS (Mar. 17, 2013),
http://www.financial-planning.com/blogs/understanding-finra-new-suitability-rules-
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only fifty-three suitability cases in 2010. Although it doubled
that total in 2011,122 the total still pales in comparison with the
tens of thousands of fiduciary duty and suitability claims brought
in court and arbitration.123 The primary source of law as to the
scope and substance of the fiduciary duty for broker-dealers is
private claims.
Broker-dealers can be found to be fiduciaries under state
common law when plaintiffs establish, for example, that they had
a relationship of trust and confidence with their broker or where
some inequality of bargaining position exists,124 although a
broker-dealer’s state law fiduciary duty is not a model of

knowing-your-customer-2679758-1.html, with Dispute Resolution Statistics, FIN.
INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRA
DisputeResolution/AdditionalResources/Statistics/ (last updated Dec. 16, 2013).
122
See Kirsch et al., supra note 121.
123
From 2002 through 2011, 61,304 arbitration claims were filed. See Dispute
Resolution Statistics, supra note 121; see, e.g., Billings v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc., FINRA Arbitration No. 11-01948 (Oct. 12, 2012), available at
http://finraawardsonline.finra.org/viewDocument.aspx?DocNb=59344
(finding
respondent violated fiduciary duty to claimants and awarding monetary relief).
124
See, e.g., Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1038
(4th Cir. 1997) (under Texas law, “ ‘[f]iduciary relationships arise when a party
occupies a position of confidence toward another’ ”); MidAmerica Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 886 F.2d 1249, 1259 (10th Cir. 1989) (under
Oklahoma law, “a fiduciary duty exists when the party in the weaker position
reasonably places its confidence and responsibility in the party in the stronger
position”); Amendolia v. Rothman, No. Civ.A 02-8065, 2003 WL 23162389, at *4
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2003) (under Pennsylvania law, the relationship between a
securities broker and his customer is a fiduciary one as a matter of law); Courtland
v. Walston & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1076, 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (“When a registered
representative is giving more than the normal amount of incidental investment
advice, and has instilled in customer such a degree of confidence in himself and
reliance upon his advice that the customer clearly feels, and the registered
representative knows that the customer feels, that the registered representative is
acting in customer’s interest, a fiduciary relationship may arise.”); Dinsmore v. Piper
Jaffray, Inc., 593 N.W.2d 41, 46 (S.D. 1999) (applying South Dakota law,
“[s]ecurities [b]rokers owe . . . fiduciary obligations to their clients . . . ‘a duty of
utmost good faith, integrity and loyalty’ ”). Broker-dealers also may be found to be
fiduciaries when they exercise discretion over a client’s account, but these cases are
not of interest here because broker-dealers who exercise discretion are already
subject to the fiduciary duty under the Advisers Act. See Certain Broker-Dealers
Deemed Not To Be Investment Advisers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-51523, 2005
WL 849053, at *1 (Apr. 15, 2005) (exercise of investment discretion is not solely
incidental investment advice and therefore not eligible for broker-dealer exemption
from the Advisers Act), vacated by Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C.
Cir. 2007). They therefore are not the focus of section 913 rulemaking, which would
primarily affect broker-dealers who are not subject to the Advisers Act.
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clarity.125 Broker-dealer customers may also be able to bring
contract or negligence claims under state common law that are
indirectly based on a suitability standard, which is somewhat
akin to a fiduciary claim.126 Thus, state law has recognized a
variety of circumstances in which a broker-dealer may be found
to have a fiduciary relationship with a client.
Federal law is not nearly as hospitable to private fiduciary
claims.127 There is no federal common law fiduciary duty outside
the fiduciary duty under the Advisers Act, and there is no private
right of action under the Act for a breach of the fiduciary duty.
Nor is there is a private right action for a violation of FINRA’s
suitability rule.128 Courts have recognized private claims for
unsuitable recommendations under the general anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities laws, but these claims are
unlikely to succeed. Plaintiffs generally must show, along with
other elements of a fraud claim, “that the defendant knew or
reasonably believed the securities were unsuited to the buyer’s
needs,” and “that, with scienter, the defendant made material
misrepresentations (or, owing a duty to the buyer, failed to
disclose material information) relating to the suitability of the
securities.”129 This is a difficult, if not insurmountable, burden of
proof for plaintiffs.

125
See Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment
Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 706 (2010) (calling broker’s fiduciary duty “a
perplexing fusion of state and federal law”); Steven A. Ramirez, The Professional
Obligations of Securities Brokers Under Federal Law: An Antidote for Bubbles?, 70
U. CIN. L. REV. 527, 550 (2002) (“Whether described as ‘considerable confusion’ or as
‘judicial smoke,’ it is clear that courts have not always consistently articulated the
fiduciary obligations of broker-dealers under state law. Even a cursory review of
authorities shows deep division within the courts regarding the fiduciary duties of
broker-dealers.”).
126
See, e.g., Keenan v. D.H. Blair & Co., 838 F. Supp. 82, 86–87 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(discussing elements of “warranty of suitability” claim); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cheng, 697 F. Supp. 1224, 1227 (D.D.C. 1988) (A violation of
the suitability rule in a common law claim “will not automatically result in [the
broker-dealer] being held liable for negligence; it would simply be a factor
consideration by the jury as to whether he acted as a ‘reasonable’ person in his
conduct toward the [customer] and their account with Merrill Lynch.”); Piper,
Jaffray & Hopwood Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292, 297 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (“[T]he
Know Your Customer Rule and the Suitability Rule may form part of the negligence
concept in common law.”).
127
See Black, supra note 94, at 67.
128
See HUNG ET AL., supra note 94, at 10.
129
Brown v. E.F. Hutton Grp., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993); see also
Coleman & Co. Sec., Inc. v. Giaquinto Family Trust, 236 F. Supp. 2d 288, 302 n.10
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This scienter-proof problem could be remedied by legislation
requiring that a broker-dealer show, as it must do in a FINRA
proceeding, that it had a reasonable basis for believing that a
recommendation was suitable. To comport with the scope of
Section 913, this burden could be limited to particularized
investment advice provided to retail investors. For example,
Section 21D of the Exchange Act could be amended to provide as
follows:
In any private action arising under this title in which a
plaintiff who is a retail investor proves that the defendant
provided particularized investment advice that was unsuitable,
the defendant shall have the burden of proving that the
defendant had a reasonable belief that the advice was suitable
based on the exercise of reasonable diligence.130
This provision would leave the burden of proof on investors
to show that a recommendation was actually unsuitable, but then
shift the burden to the broker-dealer—where it already resides
under the FINRA suitability rule—to show that the brokerdealer had a reasonable basis, based on the exercise of
reasonable diligence, to believe that the recommendation was
suitable. However, plaintiffs would still be left to deal with the
hurdles created by the steady erosion of private rights of action
under the federal securities law over the last two decades.131
A more significant problem for both state and federal private
claimants may be that most broker-dealer customers do not have
the right to bring claims in court. Since the Supreme Court’s
McMahon decision in 1987 upholding a mandatory arbitration
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Unsuitability cannot be shown by negligence alone.”); Cremi v.
Brown, 955 F. Supp. 499, 517–18 (D. Md. 1997). But cf. Stein, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-47335, 2003 WL 431870, at *4 n.31 (Feb. 10, 2003) (“Scienter is not an
element for finding a violation of the NASD suitability rule.”).
130
Section 21D sets forth various requirements for private actions under the
Exchange Act, such as those relating to pleading standards, lead plaintiffs, loss
causation and limitations on damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012).
131
Private rights of action have been eroded by the Private Litigation Securities
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995), and the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227, and
a series of Supreme Court decisions, see, e.g., Janus Capital Grp. v. First Derivative
Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2303 (2011); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct.
2869, 2883–84 (2010); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552
U.S. 148, 152–53 (2008); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308,
313–14 (2007); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345–46 (2005); Cent.
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191–92
(1994).
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clause in a broker-dealer’s customer agreement,132 these clauses
have become de rigueur in the industry.133 From 2002 through
2011, more than 60,000 arbitration claims were filed.134 No
similar data is available for comparable state and federal court
claims, but it is reasonable to assume, in light of the prevalence
of mandatory arbitration clauses, that they are greatly
outnumbered by arbitration claims. Thus, it is arbitration
panels, not courts, that are the primary source of law for private
claims based on fiduciary and suitability duties.
There is reason to believe that suitability and fiduciary
claims have some success in arbitration proceedings.135 Breach of
fiduciary duty was the most frequently asserted claim from 2008
through mid-2012; suitability claims consistently made the top
six.136 Arbitration counsel presumably would not bring so many
of these claims if they were not somewhat successful, but how
successful they are is unknown.137 Arbitrators are not required
to follow any particular source of substantive law, such as public
law standards established by the Commission or FINRA, or to
provide an explanation of their decisions unless both parties
request one,138 and the requirement that those appealing an
132
Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987); see also
Rodrigues de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)
(upholding mandatory arbitration agreement as to claim arising under Securities
Act of 1933).
133
See Bradley J. Bondi, Facilitating Economic Recovery and Sustainable
Growth Through Reform of the Securities Class-Action System: Exploring Arbitration
as an Alternative to Litigation, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 607, 622 (2010)
(“Virtually every customer agreement contains an explicit clause requiring that
disputes be heard in arbitration.”); Black, supra note 94, at 68.
134
See Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 121.
135
See Black, supra note 94, at 68 (“[I]t is generally believed that investors
frequently do recover damages from broker-dealers and investment advisers for
careless or incompetent advice.”).
136
For example, of the 4,729 arbitration claims filed in 2011, 1,619 (thirty-four
percent) and 2,589 (fifty-five percent) included, respectively, unsuitability and
breach of fiduciary duty claims. See Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 121.
137
See Stephen J. Choi et al., The Influence of Arbitrator Background and
Representation on Arbitration Outcomes 2 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 12-17, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2109712 (“The absence of detailed case-specific
information creates challenges for empirical research, making evaluation of
arbitration’s effectiveness in protecting investors’ rights exceedingly difficult.”).
138
See FINRA Rule 12904, available at, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/
display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4192. But cf. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 105, 116 Stat. 745 (permitting PCAOB proceedings to
be public only if the PCAOB finds good cause and both sides consent); H.R. 3503,
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arbitration decision show a manifest disregard for the law is
almost impossible to satisfy.139 These factors frustrate any
attempt to determine the legal standard under which fiduciary
and suitability claims are resolved. There is good reason to be
concerned about how arbitration panels decide cases. The
number of arbitration panels that have no industry
representative has increased since FINRA allowed plaintiffs to
opt for an all-public panel,140 which may have resulted in less
expertise on panels and, accordingly, less predictability as to the
law applied.141
Some commentators have dealt with the dearth of
information on the basis of arbitration decisions by extrapolating
from data on litigated outcomes. A common approach has been
to analyze investors’ win rates to determine whether arbitration
is “fair”—the theory being that the percentage of litigated
outcomes in which the investor prevails indicates whether
arbitration has a pro-industry or pro-investor bias. FINRA data
shows that, from 2007 through July 2012, the percentage of
decided cases in which claimants recovered monetary damages or
obtained non-monetary relief ranged from thirty-seven to fortyseven percent.142 On the one hand, one might conclude that,
112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011) (requiring public PCAOB proceedings except by
determination of Board); see Black, supra note 94, at 68; Barbara Black & Jill I.
Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 995–98 (2002) (discussing whether and to what extent FINRA
arbitrators apply substantive law).
139
See, e.g., Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing, L.P. v. Official Unsecured
Creditors’ Comm. of Bayou Grp., 491 F. App’x 201, 203–04 (2d Cir. 2012).
140
Dan Jamieson, All-Public Panels Are a Hit with Investors, FINRA Says,
INVESTMENT NEWS (Jan. 29, 2012, 7:16 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/
article/20120129/REG/301299988 (percentage of investor claimants choosing an allpublic panel rose from fifty-four during twenty-seven-month pilot program to
seventy-six during first full year after full implementation).
141
See Choi et al., supra note 137, at 8 (“[M]ore knowledgeable arbitrators are
likely to produce more accurate awards. Broker-customer disputes frequently
involve technical issues in which familiarity with industry practices is valuable.
Securities expertise enables an arbitrator to understand the nature of the claims
better.”); SIFMA, WHITE PAPER ON ARBITRATION IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 36–
37 (2007) [hereinafter SIFMA White Paper], available at http://www.sifma.org/
uploadedfiles/societies/sifma_compliance_and_legal_society/whitepaperonarbitration
-october2007.pdf (industry arbitrators’ expertise improves arbitration); Jamieson,
supra note 140 (quoting industry arbitrators: “[e]liminating industry panelists ‘is a
mistake’ . . . ‘Finra doesn’t do a good job of educating [public] arbitrators about
investments’ . . . ‘the public arbitrators are generally unprepared’ ”).
142
See Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 121 (2007: 37%; 2008: 42%;
2009: 45%; 2010: 47%; 2011: 44%; 2012: 45%).
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because in each year investors recovered nothing in more than
half of these cases, arbitration was biased against them. On the
other hand, based on other data showing a higher percentage of
outcomes favorable to investors, some have concluded that
arbitration is not biased against investors.143 For example, an
oft-cited 1992 GAO report found no industry bias based in part
on its finding that fifty-nine percent of litigated arbitrations were
decided in favor of investors, and that monetary awards to
investors averaged sixty-one percent of the amount of their
claims.144 In his 2002 report, Professor Michael Perino similarly
concluded that arbitration was not biased because of the balance
of litigated outcomes.145
This empirical approach is fraught with problems. For
example, what qualifies as a “win” is inherently subjective.
FINRA counts investors as prevailing when they recover
monetary damages or other non-monetary relief, regardless of
how small.
In some of these cases, defendants would
undoubtedly consider themselves to have prevailed. Even when
investors recover monetary damages, most awards go
uncollected.146
These analytical weaknesses have been
recognized previously and are not necessarily fatal. However,
evaluating arbitration based on outcomes and relief awarded
actually may miss the point altogether. The issue is whether
arbitration reaches the “right” result, not whether one side or the
other prevails in a certain percentage of cases. Investors could
143
See SIFMA White Paper, supra note 141 (citing outcomes percentages as
evidence of no industry bias in arbitration); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
SECURITIES ARBITRATION: HOW INVESTORS FARE 35–39 (1992) [hereinafter GAO,
HOW INVESTORS FARE], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/151835.pdf; U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: ACTIONS NEEDED TO
ADDRESS PROBLEM OF UNPAID AWARDS 23 (2000) [hereinafter GAO, ACTIONS
NEEDED], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/156962.pdf (concluding that
“investors have not fared as well” because investor win rate declined from fifty-nine
percent to fifty-one percent from 1992 to 1996 and to fifty-six percent and fifty-seven
percent in 1997 and 1998, respectively).
144
See GAO, HOW INVESTORS FARE, supra note 143, at 35. The GAO reached the
same conclusions in an updated report. See GAO, ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 143,
at 4–5, 7.
145
See MICHAEL PERINO, REPORT TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION REGARDING ARBITRATOR CONFLICT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN
NASD AND NYSE SECURITIES ARBITRATIONS 30–34 (2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/arbconflict.pdf.
146
See GAO, ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 143, at 5 (estimating that $129
million (eighty percent) of $161 million awarded to investors in FINRA arbitration
was unpaid).
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win fifty percent of all arbitrations, which some would interpret
to mean that arbitration was fair, but if cases in which plaintiffs
prevailed consistently involved situations in which there was no
legal basis for finding that the defendant owed a legal duty or
that the duty was violated, then, in fact, arbitration would be
unfairly biased in favor of plaintiffs.
Extrapolating “fairness” from litigated outcome data seems
inherently flawed because the determinant of litigation outcome
rates is not “fairness,” but prior litigation outcome rates. If the
parties to arbitrations act efficiently, they will litigate to a final
outcome rather than settle only when there is enough
uncertainty regarding the outcome that they are unable to reach
agreement on the expected value of the claim. If arbitrators
consistently reach unfair outcomes, the parties will adjust their
analysis of the expected value of their claims, which will in turn
shift the set of facts under which there is sufficient outcome
uncertainty to litigate. The cases in which outcomes may be
uncertain and the parties therefore choose to litigate may
comprise exclusively cases that plaintiffs, or defendants, should
always win. In other words, every outcome might be unfair, no
matter how outcomes are split.
An efficient arbitration “market” should produce litigation
outcomes each year that reflect a normal distribution curve, with
the midpoint reverting to a long-term mean as parties adjust
their litigation decisions to incorporate the most recent set of
outcome data.147 In other words, litigation outcomes necessarily
represent an equilibrium point that moves in relation to prior
outcomes based on participants’ past experience, regardless of
the fairness of any particular set of prior outcomes.148 The
equilibrium point should be the set of facts under which the odds

147
The GAO indirectly acknowledged this point in positing as one reason for a
declining win rate for investors that “broker-dealers [were] more likely to try to
settle cases that they think they might lose.” Id. at 24.
148
This equilibrium theory is consistent with findings that investors fare better
when represented by an attorney because one would expect an attorney to have more
experience evaluating when a case’s expected litigation value exceeds the value of
any settlement terms. See id. at 26 (Investors were twenty-seven percent more likely
to receive an award when represented by an attorney). Investors who are not
represented by attorneys presumably generally overestimate their chances of
success, leading to a lower percentage of favorable litigated outcomes.
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of either party prevailing are about equal, regardless of whether,
under that set of facts, the odds of either party prevailing should
be equal.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully develop a theory
regarding the irrelevance of investor win rates. For purposes of
this Article, the point is that we cannot evaluate the efficacy of
existing fiduciary or fiduciary-like private claims because the
arbitration system prevents us from knowing how these claims
fare in arbitration. In other contexts, legal standards can be
debated largely because judges’ explanations of their decisions
can be analyzed, categorized, and regurgitated in forms that
identify and reinforce consistent principles of law as applied to
generally similar fact patterns. When adjudicative forums do not
afford such transparency, the rights and obligations of
individuals become unknowable.
This might not be a concern where only a small percentage of
disputes are heard by the nontransparent forum.
When
nontransparent forums operate on the periphery of a dominant
core of transparent forums, they are likely to follow the law as
applied in explained decisions in the latter forums. When
adjudicators in these forums are retired judges who have spent
decades creating, applying, and following this legal core, they
may be likely to continue to do so even when their decisions are
no longer subject to public scrutiny. Even if non-transparent
forums do not follow this legal core, the social costs are small
because these peripheral decisions make up only a small
minority of disputes. However, when the overwhelming majority
of cases involving a set of legal principles are decided in a nontransparent forum by non-judge decision-makers who have no
industry expertise, achieving correct legal outcomes may be as
likely as a roll of the dice.149 Yet this is how the majority of
private claims against broker-dealers based on fiduciary or
fiduciary-like legal principles are decided.

149
But cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349 (West 2013) (authorizing confidential
arbitration of business disputes with both parties’ consent before state judge); Del.
Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, No. 1:11–1015, 2012 WL 3744718, at *10 (D. Del. Aug.
30, 2012) (Delaware proceedings under 10 Del. C. § 349 violate First Amendment
public right of access to civil trials); see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, § 105, 116 Stat. 745; H.R. 3503, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
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The mandatory, non-transparent nature of arbitration
frustrates any attempt to develop a public, Section 913 fiduciary
duty for broker-dealers that works in harmony with brokerdealers’ preexisting private legal obligations. How the fiduciary
duty is applied in arbitration is a necessary component of any
reasonable attempt to develop a uniform fiduciary duty with
respect to retail investment advice,150 but the SEC’s Section 913
Study had virtually nothing to say about this primary source of
fiduciary law. The Commission should give greater consideration
to Section 921 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which granted the
Commission broad authority to regulate the terms of mandatory
arbitration clauses.151 A good use for that authority would be to
adopt rules requiring arbitrators to explain their decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The SEC’s Section 913 rulemaking has run aground on the
shoals of heightened cost-benefit requirements and expectations
that cannot practicably be satisfied. Their impracticability may
be by design, as they may simply be cover for libertarian values
quite different from the utilitarian values that cost-benefit
analysis presupposes.
The Obama Administration, once a
principal instigator of the push for a fiduciary duty,152 has now
become an advocate for deregulatory initiatives under the JOBS
Act, which was passed with bipartisan Congressional support.
The courts have repeatedly demonstrated their hostility toward
SEC rulemaking, and Republican SEC Commissioners have set
the stage for a legal challenge on cost-benefit grounds to any
Section 913 rulemaking. The near-term prospects for Section 913
rulemaking by the Commission are slim.
150
See generally Strine, 2012 WL 3744718, at *5 (discussing benefits of public
proceedings).
151
Section 919B of the Dodd-Frank Act also required the Commission to study
ways to improve investor access to registration information relating to brokerdealers, including arbitration proceedings. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON IMPROVED INVESTOR ACCESS TO REGISTRATION
INFORMATION ABOUT INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 1 (2011),
available at http://sec.gov/news/studies/2011/919bstudy.pdf. The study did not
consider the mandatory publication of explanations of arbitration decisions.
152
See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION 71 (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/
FinalReport_web.pdf (“Standards of care for all broker-dealers when providing
investment advice about securities to retail investors should be raised to the
fiduciary standard to align the legal framework with investment advisers.”).
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However, the appropriate context in which to consider the
fiduciary duty is far broader than merely SEC rulemaking. The
goals of the fiduciary duty can be achieved through other sources
of law that are not as susceptible to political influence. Indeed,
while the SEC’s rulemaking stalls, FINRA has been applying a
form of fiduciary duty to broker-dealers. FINRA’s rules have had
a strong fiduciary element for quite some time, and its recent
interpretation of its suitability rule represents a significant shift
closer to a Section 913 fiduciary standard. FINRA has an
incentive to continue this process because enhancing its
credibility as a promulgator and enforcer of a fiduciary duty
should help its bid to become the self-regulatory organization for
investment advisers. Fiduciary duty advocates might do well to
redirect their efforts away from the SEC arena and toward
FINRA as a more reliable ally.
One difficulty with this approach is that FINRA is not even
the primary source of fiduciary law for broker-dealers. Fiduciary
claims are litigated most often in private lawsuits. Most private
claims are brought in arbitration proceedings, where fiduciary
claims are more frequently asserted than any other. Thus, there
is a well-established body of private law under which brokerdealers are already subject to a fiduciary duty when providing
particularized investment advice to retail customers, but the
Section 913 Study had nothing to say about the substance or
scope of this source of law, in part because arbitrators are not
required to explain their decisions. The first step in the coherent
development of a fiduciary standard for broker-dealers would be
to evaluate whether the benefits of requiring arbitrators to reveal
how that standard is already being applied would outweigh the
potential costs.

